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ABSTRACT

INTERDEPENDENCE WITH OUR MOST FORGETFUL ELDERS:
ALZHEIMER’S IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

By
Christine Heller
August 2021

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Russ Walsh
This dissertation uses autoethnography and critical psychological and
philosophical theories to explore what people with Alzheimer’s disease teach us about
being, forgetting, and dying in the Anthropocene. The author collected personal memory
data from her lived experience of being with her mother while she had Alzheimer’s
disease, and organized these memories into a series of vignettes. Each vignette was
analyzed with critical psychological and philosophical theories to illuminate
intersubjective themes of denial, things, ancestors, place, dying, and time. These themes
connected the personal to the epochal and articulated the wisdom that our most forgetful
elders can share in the Anthropocene, an era that reproduces itself around the fulcrum of
forgetfulness about the interdependence of humans with the rest of the biosphere. A
number of themes emerged which were elaborated in the form of wisdom being passed
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down from our most forgetful elders, including: denial is part of the journey, and needs to
be worked through; listen for the animacy of things and other beings; you can call upon
your ancestors for support and guidance; did you know that you can time travel?; agency
in death is difficult to discern; be a steward of chronic grief; and care is political. It was
found that our most forgetful elders remind us of our interdependence and show us ways
of resisting capitalist and colonial ontological pressures, which in turn can help us
navigate the climate chaos brought about by the Anthropocene.
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Memory is a strange bird
doling out the world in
shards –
the stuff we are made of.
I am the keeper, now,
I hold them all.
Tonight as I write I become conjurer –
when I open my hands:
a thousand sparrows
– Jessica Moore, Everything, Now
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This study investigates sharing a lifeworld with my Mom 1 while she had Alzheimer’s
disease, within the sociohistorical context of the Anthropocene. My interest in the topic of this
study arose from my experience relating to my Mom while she lived with Alzheimer’s disease,
and my dissertation is an ode to her in many languages–personal, psychological, and
philosophical. It is an ode to the persistence and evolution of our connection and how we both
related to broader cultural systems as she transformed with the progression of the disease. As her
ways of being in the world morphed through the course of her illness, she shed light on what it
means to be a person living through the Anthropocene. Her shifting subjectivity revealed wisdom
about being, forgetting and dying in this present epoch, gifts of wisdom that provided a unique
perspective on the mutually-reinforcing reproduction of subjectivity and collective historical
lifeworld. This dissertation aims to articulate these gifts through a series of stories based on my
memories of being with her through the course of her disease, alongside explorations of critical
psychological and philosophical theory which seek to elaborate on the broader implications of
these stories.
My Mom, Linda Heller, progressed from having Mild to Major Neurocognitive Disorder
due to Alzheimer’s disease over a period of 6 years, and she died from the disease in April of
2019. As her daughter, I strained to stay in contact with her spirit, something that required a
steady stream of acknowledging and grieving the small but persistent and accumulating changes

1

I use the term “Mom” rather than “Mother” because this project prioritizes intimacy over so-called

“objectivity,” which often confuses disconnection for truth.
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and losses, and celebrating our new forms of relating and co-existing along the way. As
Alzheimer’s disease morphed our shared lifeworld, she became foreign to my recollection of her,
the threads of her memory unwinding from our shared world and weaving another way of being
in the world.
This dissertation is an autoethnography, exploring my embodied relational connection to
my Mom in the context of our cultural situatedness. Autoethnography is a qualitative research
method that explores personal experience in relation to wider cultural, political and historical
meanings and phenomena, and offers an evocative, embodied perspective from which to describe
and critique the wider cultural dynamics. I draw upon existential phenomenological methods of
interpretation to explore how my Mom and others with Alzheimer’s disease may experience their
lifeworld transforming, attending to themes like dwelling in a place, being in time, relating to
things, and to other beings, human and other-than-human. My primary research question focuses
on what people with Alzheimer’s disease can teach us about being, forgetting, and dying in the
Anthropocene, an era of deep, collective forgetfulness about our interconnectedness with human
and non-human beings. I weave this all together using a distinctive method of autoethnographic
research by using a series of personal recollections about my relationship with my Mom,
followed by theoretical explorations of those stories, a method I will describe more in depth in
the method section below.
Why situate my project in the Anthropocene? The Anthropocene is perhaps the largest
scale systemic structure under which our daily lives are organized on a global level. The concept
of the Anthropocene, which will be more thoroughly defined later in this introduction, articulates
that humankind is the most powerful force shaping the vast ecosystems across our planet for the
last several hundred years. It correlates with and subsumes other vast systemic structures, such as
2

capitalism and colonialism, that shape most contemporary cultures. Importantly, its influence
structures subjectivity in ways that will be explored throughout this dissertation. I chose to frame
this dissertation within the context of the Anthropocene because it frames and drives the most
significant existential threat that humankind has ever faced, as we continue to shape the planet in
ways that make it ever more inhospitable to our own survival. The Anthropocene reproduces
itself out of a dynamic of a seeming forgetfulness about our interdependence, and instead
supports domination and objectification as primary relational structures. Despite longstanding
observations about the negative impact of human domination of the biosphere that have been
practiced over the last half millennium, modern life is organized by “systems of governance that
generate structural forgetfulness about injustice, destruction and despair” (Collie, 2019). This
dissertation asks what our most forgetful elders might teach us about forgetting, being, and dying
– important themes to investigate in understanding how and why we continue to perpetuate the
Anthropocene, and how we might survive it.
The topic is challenging to study for many reasons. It can be difficult for people with
Alzheimer’s disease to describe their experience such that someone else can understand,
especially because aphasia (difficulty speaking) is a common symptom of Alzheimer’s. I am
therefore vigilant in trying not to speak for, or over, the personal narratives of people living with
Alzheimer’s disease. Because I am not living with Alzheimer’s disease myself, I am sensitive to
the ways I might be able to approach some understanding without presuming I’ve got it right.
My methods of exploration therefore privilege this conundrum, by situating my research
autoethnographically—that is, based in my experience of relating to my Mom while she had
Alzheimer’s. Another challenge of this project is catching sight of how the Anthropocene, the
largest systemic structure we are under, has impacted my lived experience. The Anthropocene
3

can be hard to articulate in daily life because it is the water we are all swimming in. Furthermore,
distinguishing characteristics of the Anthropocene from characteristics of other large systems
such as capitalism, or United States culture, is not always clear or even possible. This project is
therefore a way of thinking into the forgetfulness of the epoch, pushing at the edges of my own
understanding.
Because this project is based in my experience with my Mom, it is important that my
readers know a few things about me and my social identities. The experience I had with my
Mom while she had Alzheimer’s disease is not intended to be representative of others’
experiences, and my cultural situatedness and role in caring for my Mom are important
contextual factors. My situatedness is important for readers to keep in mind, because I
undoubtedly hold biases and have blind spots due in part to how I was socialized. I am a 33-yearold, white, queer, able-bodied, cisgender woman, and I grew up with considerable class privilege
that has, along with my whiteness, been a major factor in my being able to access an abundance
of educational opportunities, including my current pursuit toward a PhD in clinical psychology. I
grew up in urban centers in the Pacific Northwest, mostly in Seattle. My Mom was a white,
heterosexual cisgender woman born in 1946 who grew up in a small fishing town in Alaska and
lived most of her adult life in Seattle. She experienced upward class mobility and was ablebodied for most of her life. My Mom and Dad remained married until her death in 2019, and my
Dad was her primary caregiver during the many years she had Alzheimer’s disease.
My Dad saw a different side to my Mom’s experience of Alzheimer’s: the daily
caregiving side, which was undoubtedly more challenging and exhausting, and probably a great
deal less romantic than the perspectives I share in this project. If there is an unsung hero in this
dissertation, it is my Dad, whose dedication to my Mom’s wellbeing at the end of her life was
4

core to his identity for a number of years. He did right by her throughout an impossible time in
our family. I describe myself and my older brother as secondary caregivers, because we were
both living in different states from our parents during the time my Mom had Alzheimer’s. As a
result, we were only occasionally involved in the daily care for my Mom whenever we could
visit, every few months. Despite the distance, being with my Mom while she had Alzheimer’s
disease was primary in my experience for the years during which she had it. Navigating graduate
school at the same time was a difficult season in my life, and part of how I made space for my
grief amidst the grueling workload of a PhD program was by using the space of my studies and
research to engage with it. This project is therefore the culmination of many years of exploration.
Through this project, I hope to contribute a more robust understanding of being in
relation to loved ones who have Alzheimer’s disease, to offer language to the experiences of
intersubjectivity that can deeply alter our own perception of what it means to navigate death and
life in the Anthropocene, and more specifically within a Western neoliberal cultural context in
the United States. I anticipate that my project has the potential to impact various perspectives
from practical to philosophical. Practically, I hope that my project will influence how we care for
our most forgetful elders by illuminating the definitions of selfhood that motivate our styles of
caregiving and understandings of interdependence in the Anthropocene and the Western colonial
and capitalist structures that have shaped our practices of care. Philosophically, I aim to
contribute to our understandings of intersubjectivity and selfhood, and the ways in which
memory can reinforce or challenge dominant structures of subjectivity under the conditions of
the Anthropocene. Personally, this dissertation has been one of the ways I continued to stay in
relation to my Mom after her death, and I attempt to remain faithful to my lived experience as a
guide to my writing, even as it takes me into places difficult to understand.
5

Literature Review
This section reviews the literature on the biomedical perspective of Alzheimer’s, and why
the biomedical perspective is insufficient in gaining a thorough understanding of the lived
experience of Alzheimer’s disease. Different explanatory models of Alzheimer’s disease affect
not only the experience of those living with the disease, but also how we support people and their
families through different therapeutic modalities, from pharmaceuticals to nursing homes to
public funding for research to psychotherapy, right down to how we simply have conversations
with people who have Alzheimer’s. They also influence how we relate to our loved ones who
have Alzheimer’s disease.
I will review experience-near accounts of Alzheimer’s disease that exist in the literature
and examine what gaps there are in that body of knowledge. The purpose of this literature review
is to demonstrate that an autoethnographic, critical phenomenological study on loving somebody
with Alzheimer’s disease can contribute important knowledge to various dimensions of the lives
of people who have Alzheimer’s disease and the people who love them, as well as to overarching
understandings of being in the world during the time of the Anthropocene.
Biomedical Discourse on Alzheimer’s Disease
In this section, I will review important literature on biomedical perspectives of
Alzheimer’s disease, pointing to limitations of this model and the effects of those limitations on
people with Alzheimer’s disease. Models of disease are theoretical models that are used as a kind
of roadmap to diagnosis and treatment. They conceptualize disease and health based on a number
of theoretical assumptions. In the last century, the biomedical model became the predominant
model of Western medicine. An excellent working definition for the biomedical model of
medicine comes from George Engle, who was the first to publish critiques of the biomedical
6

model and advocate for a less reductive approach to medicine. He wrote that the biomedical
model of disease:
…Assumes disease to be fully accounted for by deviations from the norm of
measurable biological (somatic) variables. It leaves no room within its framework
for the social, psychological, and behavioral dimensions of illness. The
biomedical model not only requires that disease be dealt with as an entity
independent to social behavior, it also demands that behavioral aberrations be
explained on the basis of disordered somatic (biochemical or neurophysiological)
processes. (Engel, 1977, p. 130)
Engle wrote his critiques in the 1970s, and advocated instead for a biopsychosocial model
of medicine, which incorporates social and psychological factors alongside physiological
understandings and treatments of disease. The biopsychosocial model has gained acceptance as
an improved model of disease in the decades since, however it has also gained criticism,
particularly about the difficulty doctors have in actually applying such an integrated model of
medicine (Farre & Rapley, 2017). As a result, what is practiced today in Western medicine may
be more of a “split model,” in which the psychosocial factors of disease are used as an optional
add-on to the still prioritized physiological factors (Herman, 2005). In my discussion of the
biomedical model that proceeds from here, I will use the term biomedical to mean this “split
model” approach, where the physiological explanations and treatments are the predominant way
of understanding disease, with some psychosocial dimensions as secondary factors, as this
typifies the current biomedical approach.
The biomedical perspective is not only dominant in fields where we might expect
physiological considerations to be prioritized like oncology or gynecology. The fields of
7

psychology and psychiatry have also been profoundly impacted by this model over the last
century. Even the former American Psychiatric Association (APA) president and current chair of
the DSM steering committee, Paul Applebaum, noted in 2003 that, “our brains are biological
organs by their very nature. Any [mental] disorder is in its essence a biological process.”
(Deacon, 2013, p. 848). Brett Deacon explains that the “core tenets of this approach include: (a)
mental disorders are caused by biological abnormalities principally located in the brain, (b) there
is no meaningful distinction between mental diseases and physical diseases, and (c) biological
treatment is emphasized” (2013, p. 847).
Alzheimer’s disease, a neurocognitive disorder, falls under the shared disciplines of
psychology and neuroscience. Alzheimer’s disease is typically understood in biomedical
discourse as a progressive and pathologically degenerative neurological disease that causes
neurofibrillary tangles and b-amyloid plaques in the brain (D. H. Davis, 2004, p. 369). It has
been hypothesized that the plaques and tangles cause the neurons to die, and thus create the
progressive memory dysfunction, aphasia (difficulty speaking and understanding words), apraxia
(difficulty performing skilled movements), hallucinations, and delusions typical of the disease
(Sabat, 2018, p. 18). Although there is a correlation between the presence of plaques and tangles
in the brain and Alzheimer’s Disease, no correlation has been found between the quantity of
plaques and tangles found in a brain and the degree of cognitive impairment demonstrated in
people with Alzheimer’s Disease (Sabat, 2018, p. 21). More recent biomedical research suggests
that a loss of synapses is a better brain correlate of cognitive decline than the number of amyloid
plaques or neurofibrillary tangles (Willén, Sroka, Takahashi, & Gouras, 2017). Additionally,
new biomedical research suggests that the immune system is deeply involved in the etiology and
progression of Alzheimer’s, alongside the nervous system. Heneka et al. claimed that “misfolded
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and aggregated proteins bind to pattern recognition receptors on micro- and astroglia and trigger
an innate immune response, characterized by the release of inflammatory mediators, which
contribute to disease progression and severity” (Heneka et al., 2015, p. 2). The discovery of
immune system involvement in pathogenesis has led to research showing that inflammatory
factors such as diet, intoxicants such as alcohol, and exposure to certain toxic environmental
chemicals are likely involved in the progression of the disease.
Although Alzheimer’s disease was virtually unknown to the public 40 years ago, it now
attracts significant attention from scientific and public communities (Selkoe & Hardy, 2016). In
2006, the worldwide prevalence of people diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease was 26.6 million
people (Brookmeyer, Johnson, Ziegler-Graham, & Arrighi, 2007). It is estimated that by 2050,
the prevalence will quadruple, resulting in 1 in 85 people worldwide living with the disease
(Brookmeyer et al., 2007). This is primarily a result of increasing average lifespans globally, as
age is the most significant risk factor correlated with the onset of Alzheimer’s disease. Indeed,
the United Nations Population Division projects that the number of people at least 80 years of
age will increase by a factor of about 3.7 by the year 2050 (Brookmeyer et al., 2007, p. 190). The
scope of how many people worldwide are impacted by the disease has motivated biomedical
interventions that can prevent or slow the progression of Alzheimer’s disease, as well as lay
advocacy groups who emphasize the importance of non-curative care that will help better
support people with Alzheimer’s disease and their caregivers to access a high quality of life.
The biomedical approach to treating the disease is focused on producing pharmacological
and cognitive interventions that aim at preventing, reversing, or slowing the progression of the
disease, particularly its impact on cognitive abilities. Secondarily, it attempts to find ways of
“managing” the challenging behavioral aspects of the disease, though who is primarily
9

benefitting from the management of symptoms—the person with Alzheimer’s or the people
tasked with caring for them—is up for debate. The journal Current Treatment Options in
Psychiatry recently published an article describing how the behavioral and psychological
symptoms of dementia 2 “include a diverse group of psychological reactions, psychiatric
symptoms, and behaviors that are unsafe, disruptive, and impair the care of individuals with
dementia in a given environment” (Tampi, Tampi, & Balachandran, 2017, p. 56). Whose safety
is at risk, and what metrics of safety are they implying? What exactly gets disrupted? What
would un-impaired care look like, and who would it benefit? While biomedical perspectives
attempt to generate biomedical interventions, such as pharmaceutical interventions that may
prevent or delay the progression of Alzheimer’s disease, they offer a limited perspective on the
lived experience of Alzheimer’s disease, and prioritize interventions that extend the lifespan,
preserve cognitive functioning, and reduce the cost of services above quality-of-life concerns
such as emotional and relational wellbeing. Operating from the foundational perspective of
comparing disease state to the norm, there will always be an implicit favoring and superiority of
the norm. Furthermore, these interventions are operating within a capitalist model of healthcare
where profit is prioritized. The lack of attention to emotional and relational wellbeing is not an
insignificant factor in the quality and duration of life for people living with Alzheimer’s disease.
It is no accident that biomedical interventions prioritize curative treatments over ongoing care

2

“Dementia” is a generic term referring to cognitive decline that impacts normal functioning, however it

does not refer to a specific disease. The term is sometimes used as an umbrella term to describe numerous specific
diseases defined by cognitive decline. Alzheimer’s disease is a specific neurological disease which accounts for the
majority of dementia cases. The history of these words will be further explained below.
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that focuses on enhancing quality of life.
Alois Alzheimer first described the disease in 1907 as an “unusual illness of the cerebral
cortex” (Stelzmann, Norman Schnitzlein, & Reed Murtagh, 1995). While “senile dementia” was
the term used at the time to describe a normal phenomenon of cognitive decline in older adults,
Alois Alzheimer’s description of a previously unclassified disease was used to describe cognitive
decline in individuals in their 40s or 50s, what we would now describe as early-onset
Alzheimer’s disease. Doctors in the early 1900s “used the words senile dementia and senility
interchangeably to describe mental deterioration in old age, physicians rarely distinguished
between simple forgetfulness and its more malignant form” (Holstein, 2000, p. 162). Patrick Fox
described how Alzheimer’s disease “emerged from an obscure, rarely applied medical diagnosis
to its characterization as the fourth or fifth leading cause of death in the United States in little
more than 12 years” (1989, p. 58). This began in the mid-1970s with the publication of Robert
Katzman’s argument that “senile dementia” be recategorized as Alzheimer’s disease and
included on the list of possible causes of death (1976). A major impact of this diagnostic shift in
the 1970s was the pathologization of what was up to that point considered a normal part of aging.
Along with an increasing average life expectancy, this medical recategorization took
place following a surge in cultural trust in biomedical interventions as the way to cope with
medical and social issues, which was galvanized following World War II due to medical
advances such as the polio vaccine. This confluence positioned a biomedical approach to treating
Alzheimer’s disease as the most sought-after. As advocacy for research into the disease grew, so
did the ‘small government’ ideology of the 1980s with the election of Ronald Reagan: the fiscal
restraint of the time meant that “policy approaches promising a ‘cure’ were likely to prevail over
those of ‘care’” (Chaufan, Hollister, Nazareno, & Fox, 2012). The outcome of these coinciding
11

social conditions was that a biomedical approach to defining and treating Alzheimer’s disease
became unquestioned, and the assumptions about selfhood underlying the biomedical approach
to treatment seeped into the broader cultural discourse about how we understand the subjectivity
of people living with Alzheimer’s disease, contributing to narratives that equate loss of cognitive
function with loss of selfhood.
The Issue of Selfhood
Biomedical discourses about Alzheimer’s disease tend to utilize an implicit definition of
the self that is based primarily upon identification with cognition and brain tissue. They foster a
totalizing perspective; the person with Alzheimer’s disease becomes the “Alzheimer-ed subject”
(Hinton IV, 2011), their self-hood collapsed into disease-hood, indeed even into zombie-hood, a
metaphor found in scholarly and popular literature about people with Alzheimer’s disease, which
describe them as the “living dead,” “ghouls,” and “animated corpses” (Behuniak, 2011). This
dehumanizing and limiting outcome of the biomedical model of understanding Alzheimer’s
disease implores us to imagine how else we can take up the disease in a meaningful way,
especially in a way that recognizes the preserved and enduring humanity of people living with
the disease.
The “issue of selfhood” – that is, whether people with Alzheimer’s have a “self” that
persists throughout the disease, or whether it is precisely the “self” that dies slowly and perhaps
completely before the person physically dies – is hotly contested in the literature (see for
example: Davis, 2004; Kontos, 2012; Millet, 2011). Social scientists from social interactionist
perspective have challenged the notion of the death of the self which precedes the death of the
body in people with Alzheimer’s, especially regarding how the self is constituted interpersonally.
When a person’s relational world interprets them in a totalizing fashion as the embodiment of a
12

disease, you see that “cultural definitions, care settings, and caregiving relationships […] damage
care recipients’ fragile self-esteem, leading ultimately to the loss of selfhood that is so widely
thought to be caused by neuropathology alone” (Kontos, 2012, p. 2). From this perspective, the
social field creates a significant loss of self, because of the unethical way in which people with
Alzheimer’s disease are treated: as totalized beings who do not exceed the schema of
Alzheimer’s.
Our “hypercognitive” culture tends to “exclude the deeply forgetful by reducing their
moral status or by neglecting the emotional, relational, aesthetic, and spiritual aspects of wellbeing that are open to them, even in the advanced stage of the disease.” (Post, 1998, as quoted in
Sabat, 2001, p. 320). This hypercognitive culture simply means that our society is one in which
“the image of human fulfillment is framed by cognition and productivity” (Post, 2000, p. 34).
This moral devaluation of people with Alzheimer’s disease based on their declining cognitive
capacities is reinforced by the practices of clinical psychology and neuropsychology, which
diagnose Alzheimer’s disease using tests which measure only a person’s cognitive capacities,
categorically labelling the person with Alzheimer’s based solely on their cognitive deficits.
There is no measure of so-called implicit memory, or of emotional memory in these tests. No
measure of joy. No measure of resilience. The debate about selfhood in people with Alzheimer’s
is slanted, and theories that people with Alzheimer’s have lost a “self” should be rejected
because they fail to take into account the capacities which remain intact, as well as the new ways
of being in the world which may include new strengths. Indeed, the idea that the “self” dies in
people with Alzheimer’s before their body dies is based on a definition of selfhood that is based
primarily upon activities of cognition. The consistency of the sense of self in time and place is
something that can change in people with Alzheimer’s disease. For example, it is common for
13

people with Alzheimer’s to think of themselves as existing in different moments in their life
history, for example waking in the middle of the night to get ready to go to school. The
inconsistency in locating oneself in a particular time and place creates a fluidity of subjectivity,
which challenges our culture’s notion that subjectivity is relatively static during each
developmental period in a person’s life.
Although it is undeniable that people with Alzheimer’s disease continue to have a self, I
agree with Daniel Davis that taken to the extreme, this insistence can signify an “unimpeachable
personhood, which sanitizes the dying process.” (2004, p. 377). This is to say, that there are real
losses and changes in what constitutes the self over the course of the disease. Denying those
changes and losses may unintentionally cause ambiguous and anticipatory grief of people with
Alzheimer’s disease and their loved ones to go unrecognized and unsupported.
Humanistic and Anthropological Perspectives of Alzheimer’s Disease
While the biomedical discourse on Alzheimer’s disease can richly describe some of the
physiological phenomena, especially the progression of neurological change, it falls short in
describing the lived experience of Alzheimer’s disease, and inadvertently perpetuates
dehumanizing discourses about the loss of self. Plaques and tangles do not explain the
phenomena of how people actually continue to live their lives with Alzheimer’s disease.
Centering the lived experience of the person rather than the biomedical markers of the disease
will answer different questions and provide different insights than the biomedical model can
accommodate.
Fortunately, other perspectives of Alzheimer’s disease have been written about over the
last several decades, largely in response to the dehumanizing nature of biomedical discourses.
Before Alzheimer’s disease was delineated as a unique diagnosis, “senility” was the term used to
14

describe “the perception of deleterious behavioral change in someone understood to be old, with
attention to both the biology and the institutional milieu in which such change is marked,
measured, researched, and treated” (L. Cohen, 2006). Senility was depicted in the late nineteenth
century as a state that threatened middle-class masculinity within an industrial age. Jessie
Ballenger detailed how medical descriptions of senility near the turn of the twentieth century
depicted stereotypes of the senile as “a miser, tyrant, fool, and dirty old man” (Ballenger, 2006).
Ballenger noted that while the specificity of biomedical discourses on senility, and later the more
specific designation of Alzheimer’s disease, has changed over time, the stigma of the disease has
persisted as the behavior of people with Alzheimer’s continues to be depicted as “loathsome
violations of propriety” to images of a “discredited self that was lost to the disease” (Ballenger,
2006, p. 115).
Tom Kitwood, a leading figure in person-centered, humanistic understandings of
dementia, argued that dementia does not necessarily entail a radical disintegration of the person
(1997). Kitwood posited that the experience of disease in dementia is not merely a neurological
phenomenon, but that what happens neurologically in a person with dementia is always already
intertwined with the person’s social environment. He described a “malignant social psychology”
whereby the personhood of someone with dementia is undermined by their social context,
particularly in caregiving environments where techniques of disempowerment, infantilization,
intimidation, invalidation, accusation, and other dehumanizing behaviors are used to control the
person with dementia (Kitwood, 1997). Kitwood characterized the “dialectics of dementia” as a
spiraling interactive process, where neurological impairment and malignant social psychology
interact, and malignant social psychology exasperates and possibly expedites neurological
impairment.
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Stephen Post explained the problems of a “hypercognitive culture,” which he described
as the cause of our society’s tendency to “exclude the deeply forgetful by reducing their moral
status or by neglecting the emotional, relational, aesthetic, and spiritual aspects of well-being that
are open to them, even in the advanced stage of the disease” (1998, p. 72). That our culture has
this attitude leads to “excess disability,” a concept that articulates the “discrepancy that exists
when a person’s functional incapacity is greater than that warranted by the actual impairment”
(Brody, Kleban, Lawton, & Silverman, 1971, p. 124). When a person with Alzheimer’s is treated
in ways that reasonably can be expected to diminish their self-esteem, it can actually lead to
further losses of ability (Sabat, 2001).
Pia Kontos (2006) described an embodied selfhood that persists throughout the
progression of Alzheimer’s by drawing upon the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and
Pierre Bourdieu. She posited that the “presumed loss of selfhood is itself a product of the
Western assumption that status as a full human being is completely dependent upon cognition
and memory” (p. 195) and elaborated on the social model of Alzheimer’s disease as discussed by
authors sampled above like Tom Kitwood, Stephen Post, and Steven Sabat. Kontos celebrated
their humanistic contributions to our understandings of Alzheimer’s disease, but argued that
“understandings about personhood and agency implicit in this revisioning derive from a
presumed dichotomy between the body and the self” (2003, p. 159). The consequence, she
argued, is that understandings of embodiment as a source of agency and selfhood have not been
incorporated into the discourse on the subjective experience of Alzheimer’s disease, even by
humanistic authors. Kontos instead suggested that the existential immediacy of the body as well
as its interrelationship with culture and history describe a more accurate understanding of the
enduring selfhood that persists through the progression of Alzheimer’s disease (2006). She
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claimed that selfhood “emanates from the body as a generative spontaneity that asserts itself in
an improvised engagement with the world” (2006, p. 214).
Alzheimer’s from a Phenomenological Perspective
Alzheimer’s disease can be understood phenomenologically as a disease marked by an
enduring and multifaceted transformation in the lifeworld. Some argue that the disease is
characterized phenomenologically by “a disintegrating cognition [and] impairment of the body
schema [which] leads to an impoverishment of the lifeworld” (D. H. Davis, 2004, p. 375).
“Lifeworld” is a phenomenological term that describes how we actually experience and make
meaning from living in the world in everyday situations and relations. Max van Manen
foregrounded four different existential dimensions of the lifeworld that are fundamental to lived
experience in general: “lived space (spatiality), lived body (corporeality), lived time
(temporality) and lived human [and other-than-human] relation (relationality or communality)”
(2016, p. 101). These dimensions of the lifeworld are understood as existential because they are
aspects of the lived experience of all beings. Eva Simms described the lifeworld as the “field of
being,” within which a coherent identity emerges:
The relative coherence of human identity has its foundation not in the outline of the skin
but in the coherence of a lived body as it is chiasmically woven into the places, people,
and things of its world. Selfhood is a field of being, a particular matrix of interpersonal
and spatial relationships with the body at its center (2008, p. 24).
By foregrounding the lifeworld rather than a biomedical discourse as the starting point for
investigating the phenomenon of Alzheimer’s disease, it is possible to avoid reducing a person to
their physiological, and especially their neurological and cognitive dimensions.
Beginning with a phenomenological perspective opens up a series of new questions about
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what the everyday lived experience of people with Alzheimer’s might be like. Questions emerge
such as: what happens to a person when Alzheimer’s disease tugs loose the threads that weave
her into the places, people and things of her lifeworld? And what happens to the places, people
and things from which she becomes unwoven? How might memory function as the thread that
actually weaves a person to her being-field? Do memories exist in the brain (as biomedical
narratives assert), or might memories be phenomena that are more accurately described as being
located in an embodied, cultural, relational field, beyond the periphery of the skin?
The Anthropocene
To understand the lifeworld means to understand lived experience within a specific
situatedness in place and time. In this project, I will anchor this place and time in the frame of
the Anthropocene. Although I locate my project in cultural phenomena that are situated within
the United States, the context of the Anthropocene is an important one for my exploration of the
lifeworld as I explore themes of being, forgetting, and dying within this time and place. The term
“Anthropocene” literally means “the age of human,” and describes “a geological epoch in which
earth’s atmosphere, lithosphere, and biosphere are shaped primarily by human forces” (Ellis,
2009). The term was first born in the field of geology, to indicate that “human activity is largely
responsible for the exit from the Holocene [the previous geological epoch], that is, that
humankind has become a global geological force in its own right” (Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen,
& McNeill, 2011, p. 843). I chose to situate this project in the context of the Anthropocene
because it simultaneously captures the agent of change – human behaviors of exploitation,
extraction, and consumption – and the systemic scope of the effects – all systems of the earth.
Anthropocene describes a relational phenomenon between a particular type of human activity
and place. While understanding the impacts on the planet is an important part of recognizing the
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significance of the Anthropocene as a framework for understanding my project, what is more
important is how the Anthropocene has made a particular kind of human life, a particular kind of
subjectivity, the dominant mode, which has in turn made these deleterious effects on the planet
possible.
This global geological force – humankind – is changing our planet’s climate at a
profoundly rapid pace, with devastating consequences already apparent. The US National
Academy of Sciences first warned of a warming climate due to human activities as a major threat
to humankind in 1979 (Archer & Rahmstorf, 2010, p. viii), and scientific evidence has been
mounting ever since about the multitude of ways that humans have fundamentally altered the
earth beyond climate, including deforestation, desertification, urbanization, and mass extinction.
Some scientists argue that the Industrial Revolution beginning in the 1700s marks the beginning
of the Anthropocene, when human activities shifted from subsistence agricultural means of
altering ecologies to capitalist markets of extraction that were propelled by the use of fossil fuels,
completely transforming the ecology and sociopolitical landscape of England and beyond by
1850 (Steffen et al., 2011). Others argue that the beginning of settler colonization marks the start
of the Anthropocene, with start dates ranging between 1492 and 1610, citing the importance of
colonization as an engine for climate change (H. Davis & Todd, 2017, p. 766). This correlation
connects the importance of decolonization as an intervention in slowing the climate chaos we see
today. Importantly, these changes in human society were made by moving away from reciprocal
economies toward extractive and exploitative economies, which required shifts in how people
perceive the world and experience their existence (Kimmerer, 2013).
The 1950s to the present is known as “The Great Acceleration,” a period when the scope
and impact of human enterprise increased exponentially. Between the 1950s and the early 2000s,
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the global human population doubled from 3 to 6 billion, economic activity rose 15-fold, fossil
fuel use increased by a factor of 3.5, and over half the global population migrated to urban areas,
leaving behind agricultural lifestyles and adopting consumerist ones (Steffen et al., 2011). This
period of acceleration caused massive shifts in all aspects of the environment, impacting
atmosphere, watersheds, biodiversity, and so on. See Figure 1 on the next page for a visual
representation of the dramatic changes to the environment and to human economies over the
Industrial Revolution. Since the turn of the 21st century, trends of the great acceleration have
continued and expanded, as the consumption of fossil fuels has extended beyond the Western
countries that drove it in the 20th century to include nations like China, India, Brazil, South
Africa and Indonesia (Steffen et al., 2011). Although scientific recognition of climate change and
biodiversity loss resulting from global human society began in the 1960s, the rates of change and
loss have only accelerated since that time, “initiating a mass extinction episode unparalleled for
65 million years,” meaning that “on human time scales, this loss would be effectively permanent
because in the aftermath of past mass extinctions, the living world took hundreds of thousands to
millions of years to rediversify” (Ceballos et al., 2015). The Anthropocene is a geological epoch
of profound change and existential threat, whereby humans are rapidly destroying the ecologies
that we are dependent upon for our own survival.
In this dissertation, I unfold ideas around a global society that has seemingly forgotten
what the means of reproduction of life are, such that we are actively creating a future in which
human life will not thrive, with some scientists (albeit a minority) even predicting the possibility
of civilization collapse within my lifetime (Bendell, 2018). Further, my Mom was born in 1946,
meaning her lifetime entirely coincided with the period of great acceleration described above.
Our relationship has many inheritances of remembrance and forgetting during this transitional
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time on earth, and I attempt to write into the forgetfulness of the Anthropocene by remembering
my interwovenness with my Mom and our interwovenness with this time and place.
Figure 1
Figure 1. (a) The increasing rates of change in human activity since the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution.
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Figure 1, continued. (b) Changes to the Earth resulting from increase in human activity.

Note. Figure 1 from Steffen et al. (2011, pp. 851-852).
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Methods
The goal of this project is to explore what it was like to share a relational world with my
Mom while she lived with Alzheimer’s disease and at the same time be deeply responsive to the
sociopolitical and historical dynamics of living in the Anthropocene. I want my readers to feel in
their bodies the rhythms of remembering, the textures of lifeworlds and temporal horizons
shuffling. I want my readers to question what they have forgotten, to feel their own lacunas of
belonging, and to inch toward the portals of liminality we are invited to enter by our forgetful
elders. I also wanted this project to be a bridge that could keep me in connection with my Mom
following her journey through living with Alzheimer’s disease.
Given my personal connection to the subject, the umbrella method used in this
dissertation is autoethnography. This method allowed me to explore the deeply interpersonal and
emotional aspects of being in relation to my Mom while she had Alzheimer’s disease, and to
move through the research process in my own embodiment and with my own wounded heart as a
critical piece of what can be known about the experience of loving somebody with Alzheimer’s.
Drawing from ethnographic roots and the “thick description” of cultural experience in
meaningful context (Geertz, 1973), autoethnography opens up the investigation of embodied
experience and addresses issues related to other ethnographic approaches of appropriation and
exploitation of the Other as an appendage of colonial expansion. Using autoethnography allowed
me to approach understanding the lived experience of being in relation to my Mom while she had
Alzheimer’s disease within a particular sociocultural context, and to simultaneously respect that I
cannot know what my Mom, or others with Alzheimer’s disease, are really experiencing. It
allowed me to stay in my body and share what I know, which turns out to be a lot, while
avoiding claims about my Mom’s experience that I could not definitively know. The relational
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field between myself and my Mom was, and continues to be, a rich and mysterious place for
exploration. As Merleau-Ponty wrote with respect to being in relationship, “It is in the space
between him and me that it unfolds” (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 63), meaning that existence
becomes meaningful only through our interactions with our lifeworld. I took this deeply to heart
as I prioritized autoethnography as my method of choice and trusted that the relational field
between my Mom and I was a place where a meaningful understanding of being, forgetting, and
dying in the Anthropocene could be found. Adams and Holman Jones wrote that
autoethnographies, like queer theory, “take up selves, beings, ‘I’s, even as they work against a
stable sense of such self-subjects or experience and instead work to map how self-subjects are
accomplished in interaction and act in and upon the world” (T. Adams & Holman Jones, 2008, p.
379).
Through the exploration of my relating to my Mom and of reading other accounts of
living with Alzheimer’s, I attempted to examine how certain existential facets of life are altered
through the experience of Alzheimer’s disease as well as by loving somebody who has
Alzheimer’s. I looked at how my Mom and others with Alzheimer’s experience embodiment and
dwelling in a place and time, how they relate to things, and how they relate to other beings,
human and otherwise. Some of these descriptions were influenced by phenomenological methods
of inquiry, most explicitly from the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I resisted adapting a
structured incorporation of phenomenological methods of inquiry, however, as I wished to keep
my mode of inquiring into this topic as open to improvisation and creative expression as
possible. Therefore, I did not adapt the work of thinkers like Amedeo Giorgi (2009), who created
a very structured form of doing phenomenological research.
I am asking what we can learn from people with Alzheimer’s disease about being,
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forgetting, and dying in the sociopolitical global epoch we are in, which may be called by many
names, which I will call the Anthropocene. I explore how a close observation of the lived
experience of people with Alzheimer’s disease exposes shortcomings in how we care for one
another, due to structural issues such as colonialism and capitalism and their resulting
stratifications of power and erosion of familial and communal support networks, as well as our
alienation from place and our extractive relationship with the earth. I examine the apparently
fluid subjectivity of people with Alzheimer’s may offer us a new perspective on living and dying
well in an era of deep, collective forgetfulness about our interconnectedness with human and
non-human beings.
Autoethnography and Critical Bifocality
Autoethnography is most simply defined as a method of research that studies the self in
relation to culture. It aims to use the researcher’s “personal experience to describe and critique
cultural beliefs, practices, and experiences” (T. E. Adams, Holman Jones, & Ellis, 2015, p. 1). It
is a method that first began to be articulated in the 1970s, initially as a reparative move to
ethnographic research, which was under scrutiny for its lack of reflexivity of the researcher. The
problem that resulted from the lack of reflexivity was that ethnography was being used as a tool
of colonialism, describing “the Other” without grasping the positioning of the researcher being
implicitly positioned as superior, more civilized, and so on. Furthermore, ethnography was used
as a political tool for colonial expansion. This is not a metaphor (Tuck & Yang, 2012): academic
anthropology and the practice of ethnography was intentionally and explicitly used as an
appendage of the state for “the construction of colonial and neo-colonial societies through
ethnographic practice” (Pels & Salemink, 1994, p. 1). The emerging method of autoethnography
was intended to invite researchers to investigate their own subjective experiences and their own
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cultures, and to open up a critical reflection on their own positionality and culture, which tended
to be obscured in ethnography. The method that took shape dialogues personal experience with
cultural critique, revealing situated aspects of the relation of self to culture in ways that may
reveal, question, resist, or transform normative cultural discourses in the researcher’s home
culture(s) (T. E. Adams et al., 2015).
Autoethnography is sometimes dismissed as a “navel-gazing” method that dwells in the
personal to such a degree that it is not relatable or a source of valuable information (Sparkes,
2002). And indeed, there are examples of the method being used in such a way that is not
sufficiently connected to a cultural investigation. It is true that autoethnography goes against
dominant paradigms of research by prizing the subjective as an important form of knowledge.
Against accusations that autoethnography is self-indulgent, Arthur Bochner and Carolyn Ellis
(2016) argued that researchers are more susceptible to self-indulgence when they practice
methods that allow them to believe that their subjectivity, including their social locations along
race, gender, and class lines, can be prevented from “contaminating” their science.
One of the clear advantages to autoethnography is that it is evocative and embodied,
recognizing “the embodied person as an epistemically fruitful condition for the production of
knowledge” (Breuer & Roth, 2005, p. 426). Being able to write about your own embodied,
affective experience of the self-culture relationship provides important information that is
difficult to access in less embodied ways. These experiences can be written about in a way that
evoke embodied learning on behalf of the reader as well. Not only is this a valuable form of
information, but it is a form of knowledge that is in short supply in our current sociopolitical
climate, and thus gives access to a type of knowledge that may be especially revealing about
sociopolitical conditions. Jones & Harris wrote, “the political and scholarly potential of
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autoethnography is still very much emerging and expanding, particularly in its potential to both
evoke empathic and affective responses at a time of public numbness, a practice crucial to
making scholarly research relevant to the work of global citizenship” (2019, p. 4).
Autoethnography is not another form of memoir, in that autoethnography explores and prioritizes
the cultural dimension of personal experience, it engages with and extends existing research, and
it makes a direct appeal to the embodied experience of the reader (S. Jones, Adams, & Ellis,
2016).
This overarching framework of moving between embodied, lived personal experience
and sociopolitical context is captured well by the term “critical bifocality.” Critical bifocality is a
term introduced by Michelle Fine and Lois Weis, who articulated it as: “a theory of method in
which researchers try to make visible the sinewy linkages or circuits through which structural
conditions are enacted in policy and reform institutions as well as the ways in which such
conditions come to be woven into community relationships and metabolized by individuals”
(2012, p. 174). Critical bifocality, although not confined to articulating personal experience and
often used in ethnographies as well, aims to understand how structures of sociopolitical power
get under our skin, and so there is a generative resonance between autoethnography and critical
bifocality.
Why use autoethnography in my dissertation? Because as I aim to understand
interdependence with people who have Alzheimer’s disease within this sociohistorical moment, I
wanted to get as close with all my senses as I could. One of the significant challenges with this
work is that as the disease progresses, people with Alzheimer’s tend to lose their ability to speak.
The world of words gets loose and different forms of communication are needed, which move
from the body. How do I ask with traditional methods of inquiry about what it is like to be with
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Alzheimer’s? Traditional methods such as interviews are helpful with people in the early stages
of the disease, but are simply not practical or possibly even ethical in the later stages. This
conundrum is played out in scientific research, as there are far fewer studies that examine the
lived experience in the moderate or severe stages of the disease than there are in the mild earlier
stages.
Prizing this ethical conundrum, I decided to ask myself instead: how am I in relation to
my Mom? Understanding that I would only get a partial perspective of her experience this way, I
wanted to make a case for the particular positioning I have had in relation to her that gives access
to the intersubjective realm of experience. My body began from her body, and my spirit from
hers. She trained my senses in my childhood and I am fluent in the language of her touch,
gestures, facial expressions, all of which she continued to communicate through up until her
death. Without the rhythm of relating between self and other, there is no self: “there is no ‘inner’
life that is not a first attempt to relate to another person” (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 67). Both my
Mom and I have become who we are together, through one another, amongst our many other
relationships. Autoethnography allowed me to document my observations from a deeply felt
sense of my own experience of being in relation to her. It gave me a chance to express the
language of relating to her that I know in my bones. It is a method which allowed me to do
research in a home of relational ethics. It allowed me to be flexible and creative, and gave me
authority to share what I have learned from my Mom about our journey through her experience
of Alzheimer’s disease.
Phenomenological Inquiry
My dissertation is informed by phenomenological inquiry, which I used like a tool within
the overall toolbox of autoethnography. My recollections about my Mom informed the
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phenomenological investigation I explored by examining how the core existential facets of life
are altered through the experience of Alzheimer’s: how she experiences embodiment and
dwelling in a place and time, how she relates to things, and how she relates to other beings,
human and otherwise.
Phenomenology offers a way into lived experience through the lifeworld, the world as we
live it, pre-reflectively rather than conceptually. It allows for the “study of lived or existential
meanings; it attempts to describe and interpret these meanings to a certain degree of depth and
richness” (Van Manen, 2016, p. 11). I am attracted to the way that phenomenology understands
existence, that it researches what it means to be human, to be attuned to others and to the world
around us, to see the hidden under the apparent. Phenomenology sees that “the ‘external’ world,
body and consciousness are all fundamentally intertwined, inter-relating and mutually
influencing” (Allen‐Collinson, 2011, p. 3). It is an exceptionally useful methodological attitude
to use to describe relationality. I resonate with Allen-Collinson’s description of the gift of the
phenomenological attitude, which she describes as “one of enchantment, an attempt to suspend
our ‘adult’ knowledge and preconceptions in order to view the world through the fresh, excited,
‘naive’ eyes of childhood” (Allen‐Collinson, 2011, p. 5). This especially resonates with my
project, where my embodied memories of being with my Mom were the playground of
experience that I drew from for my analyses.
If the psychological dimension of human life cannot be captured by quantitative forms of
analysis, Maurice Merleau-Ponty asks in The World of Perception, what else can we know about
it, and how? He invited psychological inquiry to depart from Cartesian dualism, pointing instead
toward a cohesive world of meaning accessible through perception, which cannot be known by a
“utilitarian attitude” of disembodied intellect (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 31). The world of
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perception is accessible through bodily engagement in the sensorial world within which one
dwells; it welcomes those who approach with a playful and embodied method of understanding.
Indeed, “we live meanings through bodily participation in the world” (Todres, 2007, p. 33), and
so I attended to topics like how people with Alzheimer’s move through the world, and how the
people in their lives move around and with them.
Bracketing is an especially helpful practice that I borrowed from phenomenology.
Alzheimer’s disease has a sedimented discourse around it as a biomedical, neurological disorder.
As our culture has become increasingly obsessed with understanding the brain as the central
locus of who we are and how we experience the world, Alzheimer’s and other neurocognitive
disorders have been associated with the loss of self, the loss of identity, death in life (Behuniak,
2011). Van Manen described bracketing as a way to “come to terms with our assumptions, not in
order to forget them again, but rather to hold them deliberately at bay and even to turn this
knowledge against itself, as it were, thereby exposing its shallow and concealing character”
(2016, p. 47). It was therefore a helpful practice to lift off this sedimented discourse around
Alzheimer’s disease and get curious about what it may be like to live with it, both being
embedded in such discourses and on a more embodied, pre-verbal level of experience.
Cultural Criticism
An important part of my dissertation was to eventually flip the question on its head and
ask: what can we learn from our most forgetful elders about what it means to remember, to be,
and die in the Anthropocene? We, who have forgotten so much about being in relationship with
each other and with the broader ecology of non-human beings with whom we live and upon who
we depend for our survival. To ask this question means I already have a critique, clearly, of our
culture. I aimed to understand through the experience of people living with Alzheimer’s about
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what is going wrong with our society, and what we might be able to learn about how we can
improve it from people living with Alzheimer’s.
The cultural critique part of the dissertation is the least connected with a particular
method, but it falls under the umbrella of autoethnography nonetheless, as it examines the culture
we are situated in. I drew inspiration here from Indigenous and other thinkers who contemplate
colonialism, socialist feminist thinkers, and ecopsychologists, among others, to make sense of
our sociopolitical context. My aim was to look closely at the sociocultural context within which
people in the United States (and to some extent the broader globalized Western world) have
Alzheimer’s. To get descriptive about the structures that get under our skin. Again, this picks up
the critical bifocality discussed above, and this time centers the context, and positions people
with Alzheimer’s as the ones who may have something important to teach the rest of us.
A Twist in the Project with my Mother’s Death
My Mom died in April of 2019. While I began this dissertation as a project for me to
learn how to stay in connection with her through all the changes she was going through, the task,
in some ways, changed after her death. When I began this project, I planned to incorporate more
“live” observation, using data collection practices such as field notes. Following her death, I
transitioned the project somewhat to be focused instead on data collection from my own
memories. Van Manen wrote, “sometimes the best anecdotes are re-collected as one tries to
make sense of things that somehow seem interesting now, in hindsight” (Van Manen, 2016, p.
69, italics in the original). This project saw me through the beginning of hindsight, as she died
after it began.
While my relationship with my Mom is ongoing, since she died my experience of being
with her has changed dramatically. I now find it easier to recall memories from when she was
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healthy. In the few months immediately following her death, I experienced memories of her
more vivid than any I’ve ever had before, as I will detail in the chapter “Time Traveling.”
Memories that felt real, as if what I was remembering was actually happening in the present.
Perhaps this dissertation would have had different findings if she were still alive throughout the
project. The timing of her death is, regardless, simply an important part of the introduction to this
work, as it influenced not only my data collection methods but also surely my resulting data and
analysis.
Data collection
The primary data collection for this dissertation is a series of written recollections
presented as vignettes about my experience of being with my Mom while she had Alzheimer’s
disease. I also collected other sources of data such as artifacts and previously written
observations to supplement my written recollections. I analyzed those data using
phenomenological and critical cultural and psychological interpretations in subsections following
each vignette. I collected personal memory data (Chang, 2008), that is, a series of recollections I
have about interacting with my Mom throughout my lifetime, primarily focused on our
relationship during the time she had Alzheimer’s disease. I focused on emotionally resonant
memories, so as to mirror one of my observations about her: that emotional resonance is a
compass. In choosing these recollections, I aimed to stay primarily with my embodied, lived
experience, and to write evocatively, so as to inspire resonance in my readers. The vignettes were
selected to prevent redundancy in my analyses and to contribute to a coherent gestalt.
After writing several recollection vignettes, the next step in my process was to analyze
each vignette, some of them through an existential phenomenological lens, and some through a
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cultural criticism lens depending on what seems to be implicitly suggestive in the vignette. This
structure of first crafting a number of stories and then allowing a theoretical interpretation
emerge from the stories themselves is inspired by the dissertation of Dorothy Cashore (2019),
who wrote an ecopsychological authoethnography using a similar structure. Part of what attracts
me to the method with which Cashore wrote her dissertation is that the series of stories can be
read independently of the theory and cultural criticism that emerges in the following analyses,
making the text more experience-near and potentially accessible to a wider audience.
Summary
Studying the lived experience of Alzheimer’s disease within the sociopolitical context of
Western neoliberal colonialism and the Anthropocene can contribute to the working knowledge
we use to make decisions about caring for people with Alzheimer’s, as well as open questions to
what we might learn from our forgetful elders in a sociopolitical context that requires a
forgetting of interdependence in order to be reproduced. This dissertation aims not only to
further progress the lineage of humanistic and phenomenological-anthropological understandings
of Alzheimer’s disease, a body of work which primarily serves to critique, correct and repair the
problems of biomedical discourses on Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias. This dissertation
aims to step beyond the position of reparative reading of people with Alzheimer’s, to establish a
generative reading of what we might learn from the wisdom of our elders with Alzheimer’s
disease about being, forgetting, and dying in the Anthropocene.
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Chapter 2: The Elephant in the Room
One of the most tender parts of my experience in being with my Mom while she had
Alzheimer’s Disease is that she never spoke with me about that fact that she had it. Not once
over the four years that she was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s. Not in the year before that when
she had a diagnosis of Mild Cognitive Impairment. Or in the five years before that, when her
“chemo brain” made everyone in my family spend time in private with their fears that she may
be developing Alzheimer’s. A decade altogether that Alzheimer’s loomed over my family,
shrouded in secrecy and denial. Writing that sentence makes my chest feel like there are steel
plates weighing down on it. I sigh.
I recall the closest I ever got to discussing her diagnosis directly with her. My parents
were still living in Portland, Oregon at the time, and I must have been around 26 years old. It was
a warm, sunny summer day, and I was sitting in their backyard reading. Spending time at my
parents’ house after I graduated from college always made me feel like I was back in high school
again. I lived in Seattle at the time and would often spend a few nights with them when I came to
visit, to make the 3-hour drive worth it. Sleeping in my old twin bed, all my belongings from
high school still decorating my bedroom, posters from movies I used to like still hanging on the
walls, it was like a time capsule in my bedroom from when I was 18 years old. It was easy for
me to revert back to feeling like a teenager: misunderstood, easily annoyed, defensive.
On this visit, my parents happened to have an appointment with my Mom’s neurologist,
who had diagnosed her with Mild Cognitive Impairment and had insisted that she not be allowed
to drive anymore. This was a major blow to my Mom’s sense of independence, and she was
incredulous. She came outside to see what I was doing, and her rage followed her, red under her
skin, sharp and acrid in her voice. When I asked what was wrong, she told me that the doctors
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were lying and trying to take her driver’s license away, and that she was just fine. She was
furious with my Dad and suspected that he was the mastermind who had found these doctors
willing to lie and take away her independence. The air around her seemed to turn red and electric
with her anger.
Moments like these pose a question to loved ones. Do you join with her? Argue another
perspective? Distract and deflect? Being her daughter in this situation brought all of these
questions into the framework of our relationship and throttled us by spatial association into the
time period when I was in high school. That meant that disagreeing would make me the stubborn
child. Redirecting would make me patronizing. Joining with would make me collude with
something seemingly dangerous and would increase the emotional labor for my Dad if I blew
wind in the sails of her demand to keep her driver’s license. The small child in me, whose
relationship to her mother was simple, loving, and utterly dependent, was terrified that my Mom
was saying something with such raw emotion that I simply did not understand: what does she
mean, my Dad is the mastermind?
Years later, it is easier to analyze these options of how I might have responded. Now that
I’ve had several years of engaging with my Mom while she had Alzheimer’s disease in the time
since this story took place, I have learned many lessons about what worked and what didn’t
when trying to connect with her. Training to become a clinical psychologist in the later years of
her illness also helped me learn communication strategies like reflection and resonance. But at
the time, this was still new for me, and what to do was not so clear. When it happened, I felt
confused and put on the spot, but hungry for the slight acknowledgement—even
acknowledgement by explicit denial—that Alzheimer’s was in the picture at all.
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I did what I could to try to receive her anger and calm her down, but I’ll readily admit I
didn’t do a great job. I felt so emotionally torn, and at first I tried to avoid the conversation
entirely by offering her a glass of water, hoping that it would redirect her. That only made her
angrier, and understandably so – I was not offering any resonance to her devastating anger about
losing her driver’s license. It is hard for me to remember what happened after that – the
powerful, flashbulb part of this memory was the startle I felt by her partial acknowledgement and
anger. What I do remember is that I tried to side with her neurologist, asking why a doctor would
lie to her. Looking back, I imagine it was hurtful to my Mom for me to “stick to the facts.” But
something about deviating from them felt scary, like I may just be stoking the flames of her
anger. And more than anything, I wanted to connect with her about the most difficult thing that
has ever happened to me: my Mom having Alzheimer’s. I was desperate for her to meet me in
that fact, so I did everything I could to try to make her join me there. It was to no avail.
Denial
Denial is a common experience of people with Alzheimer’s disease, especially in the
early stages. Denial is “an instant, nonreflective process,” which is different from the more
conscious process of repression; denial says “This is not happening,” while repression says “This
happened, but I’ll forget about it because it’s too painful” (McWilliams, 2011, p. 103). Another
way to understand denial is as a process of “avoiding awareness of aspects of external reality that
are difficult to face by disregarding sensory data” (Gabbard, 2014, p. 37). By disregarding
sensory data, denial can be understood to happen unconsciously, that is, before any conscious
arrangement or interpretation of sensory information has happened. Although denial is
understood as a “less sophisticated” defense mechanism than altruism or humor (Gabbard, 2014),
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it is commonly experienced by people in both benign and more troubling situations throughout
the lifespan. For example, denial is common in emergency situations where denying the intense
emotional response of a life-threatening situation can make the difference between life and death,
such as denying overwhelming fear in order to run toward a fire to rescue someone. However,
denial can also lead to life-threatening situations, such as when people misuse psychoactive
substances and deny they have a problem to such a degree that they become seriously ill or even
die.
Imagine that you are in the 7th decade of your life, and you notice you are starting to
forget things that once came easy to you: the name of your friend’s wife, the route home from
across town. After putting it off for some time, you make an appointment with a neurologist after
a scary incident of getting lost and not remembering where you live. After a series of tests,
possibly a PET scan, your doctor gives you the news: you have probable Major Neurocognitive
Disorder due to Alzheimer’s Disease. A fatal disease. Although Alzheimer’s disease looms in
our cultural consciousness as a well-known illness among older adults, what the general public
thinks about is the forgetfulness, not the deadliness. Being diagnosed with a terminal illness that
causes the steady decline of short- and long-term memory faculties, as well as the loss of speech,
motor skills, and the ability to live independently is, understandably, devastating to most people.
When the degree of loss is considered, psychological defenses like denial make perfect sense.
In the history of the field of psychology through the 20th and beginning of the 21st
centuries, there has generally been a movement from predominantly psychoanalytic descriptions
of psychological phenomena in the era of Sigmund Freud, to other epistemologies, first with
behavioral explanations, then social explanations, and finally neurological explanations coming
to dominate the field by the 1990s. As technologies allowed for more detailed mappings of the
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brain, both research and cultural discourses at large about why we experience the world the way
we do began to favor neurological explanations, boiling down to the explanation that a series of
neurons firing creates your lived experience. It was perhaps an over-correction of the
psychoanalytic heyday in which experience was explained through unconscious drives. It is not a
coincidence that neurological descriptions also neutralized “blame” away from the person, as
well as away from environmental and political factors. By locating psychological phenomena
primarily in the brain, neither personal nor sociopolitical change was actually required; rather
these phenomena could be “managed” through the use of psychopharmaceuticals, a multi-billiondollar industry. By the 2010s, a more concerted movement to integrate these various
explanations started to spread through the field, and a biopsychosocial approach has recently
become the aspirational norm, although in practice there remains an emphasis on neurological
factors.
A biopsychosocial description of the phenomenon of denial in people with Alzheimer’s
disease is a complicated endeavor, one that I will briefly outline here. When attending to the
biological phenomena in the experience of denial in people with Alzheimer’s disease, the most
relevant concept is “anosognosia,” which describes a “lack of awareness about illness or
impairment” that correlates with brain lesions and neurodegenerative diseases (Mograbi, Brown,
& Morris, 2009, p. 989). Anosognosia essentially describes the faulty neurological functioning of
the ability to internally monitor one’s cognitive and behavioral functioning. Anosognosia is “not
an ‘all or none’ phenomenon and it can vary in degree, from a lack of concern and attention to a
neurological deficit to explicit verbal denial” (Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004, p. 275).
Anosognosia includes multiple aspects of unawareness. Importantly, it traces the origin of the
phenomenon to brain lesions, despite the fact that researchers have been unable to find a
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relationship between degree of awareness deficits and generalized cognitive impairment, based
upon measures of global cognitive functioning, memory, attention and language. (Burgess,
Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998). It is no surprise that explanations of human
behavior that focus on brain activity include exactly the kind of denial that I wish to unpack in
this chapter. There is a denial that the biological theory is incomplete despite clear limitations of
this perspective.
From a psychological perspective, Glen Gabbard describes denial as a way that people
with Alzheimer’s “defend against catastrophic anxiety by avoiding awareness of their defects”
(2014, p. 388). Integrating the new information about having Alzheimer’s disease requires also
integrating that you may forget your loved ones; that you may forget important aspects of who
you are; and that, more than ever before in your life, you are approaching death. Denial in this
sense is an adaptive coping response to mitigate the catastrophic emotional impact that this
information can have. Denial allows for a certain experience of life as open-ended and
unimpaired to continue. It allows for the (more or less) seamless continuity of a lifeworld.
Lisa Snyder, a clinical social worker who has dedicated her career to better understanding
the subjective experience of people living with Alzheimer’s disease, compiled a series of
interviews of people describing their lived experience of Alzheimer’s. One person she
interviewed, whose pseudonym is Bill, described his experience of being diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s:
At age 54, it seemed like I was labeled incompetent after a lifetime of proficiency. The
psychologist who tested me said that I would find it increasingly arduous to work, or
even drive a car. I was devastated. After the diagnosis, I remember walking out of the
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clinic and into a fresh San Diego night feeling like a very hopeless and broken man. […]
I wondered if there was anything for me to live for. (Snyder, 2009, p. 41)
Although Bill does not describe denial in part of his first reaction to being diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s, his wrenching description makes clear what is at stake, and why someone may
grapple to integrate this information into their lifeworld, and how it could trigger a feeling of
catastrophic anxiety. The diagnosis is threatening to his identity as a person who has always been
proficient.
In addition to this classic understanding of denial, there’s an additional psychological
component to why denial may be called upon by people with Alzheimer’s that is specific to the
common feature of the disease of decreasing and ultimately ceasing ability to learn or remember
new information, as well as the phenomenon that short-term memory tends to decline earlier and
more thoroughly than long-term memory. “Because recent memory tends to be sacrificed before
remote memory, many patients can clearly recollect how they used to be, which makes their
current dysfunctional state all the more disturbing to them” (Gabbard, 2014, p. 389). The more
disturbing the new information about oneself is, the more likely a person is to draw upon blunt
defensive coping strategies like denial.
How is denial a social phenomenon? “Denial masks shame” (Wilson, 2003, p. 286). Or,
in other words, denial is a strategy that is unconsciously employed to avoid the feeling of shame.
Because the experience of shame can be so painful, it is common for the shame to “go
underground” and be the agent of other defense mechanisms including denial (Scheff, 2004, p.
231). Denial is an escape hatch from the uncomfortable feeling of shame, and the relational
consequences of disconnection, which also can decrease one’s felt sense of safety and belonging.
Shame is defined in Relational Cultural Theory, as “a felt sense of being unworthy of
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connection” (Hartling, Rosen, Walker, & Jordan, 2000, p. 3). Shame exists in “an interpersonal
context that is inextricably tied to relationships and connection [and to] the real or perceived
failure of meeting cultural expectations” (Brown, 2006, p. 45). Denial from this perspective is a
relational strategy that aims to maintain cohesion of identity and relational connections within a
particular lifeworld by covering over a threatening truth. Returning to Bill’s testimony from
above, his statement that he was “labeled incompetent after a lifetime of proficiency” (Snyder,
2009, p. 41) is exactly the kind of threatening truth that could generate a feeling that one is
unworthy of belonging, if they identify their self-worth strongly with being proficient, as many
Americans do.
Additionally, there are cultural influences on denial in the context of someone with
Alzheimer’s disease. The scope of this study is focused primarily on the culture in the United
States, however there are some similarities that extend beyond the US due to globalization and
neoliberal imperialism. Of major import here is that the US has a culture of death denial perhaps
unparalleled in the rest of human history. Over the last 100 to 150 years as death care became
outsourced to hospitals and other businesses, the average lifespan extended, infant mortality rate
decreased, and urbanization drove people to be disconnected from the animal death involved in
their subsistence, people simply became less exposed to death. Knowledge about caring for
people who are dying as well as how to tend to their bodies after death was lost as this
outsourcing began. The impact of a culture of death denial in many ways returns to the
phenomena of shame and fear: shame for being cast an outsider due to being terminally ill, and
fear about experiencing death, a fear which is exaggerated because there is more about dying that
is left to imagination and that is valued negatively.
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Death became hidden, covered over, denied. In this sense, the cultural influence on
denial in people with Alzheimer’s disease is the same as any person facing a terminal illness.
Add onto that a cultural understanding in the last 100 years in the US shifting ever more toward
human subjectivity as defined primarily by cognition, no doubt influenced by the increasing
economy of information. People with Alzheimer’s disease are facing both their own death and
the decline of that part of them that is most valued in our culture: their cognition. Falling out of
belonging to a culture with which a person once felt strongly identified can easily lead to the
feelings of incoherence that can trigger a response of denial.
Although denial is only rarely addressed in psychological research as an intersubjective
or relational phenomenon, it is possible that the social aspects of denial may be the most
powerful. Interpersonal and intersubjective theories of psychology and psychotherapy, such as
Relational Cultural Theory (Jordan, 2018), illuminate the incredible importance of the social
world on our psychological experience. The question that this brings up, is where exactly does
denial exist? Is denial an internal psychological device? Or does it exist in the space between two
or more people? Is it socially co-constructed? Eva Simms wrote, “The relative coherence of
human identity has its foundation not in the outline of the skin but in the coherence of a lived
body as it is chiasmically woven into the places, people, and things of its world. Selfhood is a
field of being, a particular matrix of interpersonal and spatial relationships with the body at its
center” (Simms, 2008, p. 24). Denial is a device that aims to maintain the relative coherence of
human identity against threats of incoherence, and it is co-created by the places, people and
things within someone’s field of being.
Next, I will flip the question around from how denial shows up in people with
Alzheimer’s, to how denial shows up in American culture. I intend both to demonstrate that
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people with Alzheimer’s are not the “other,” and that we may have a great deal to learn about
being, forgetting and dying in the Anthropocene from people with Alzheimer’s.
Denial in the Culture
The preceding subsection explored denial in an individual person. Denial is not only an
intrapsychic phenomenon; it exists relationally, culturally, and institutionally as well. Stanley
Cohen (2013, p.1) wrote:
One common thread runs through the many different stories of denial: people,
organizations, governments or whole societies are presented with information that is too
disturbing, threatening or anomalous to be fully absorbed or openly acknowledged. The
information is therefore somehow repressed, disavowed, pushed aside or reinterpreted.
Or else the information “registers” well enough, but its implications — cognitive,
emotional or moral — are evaded, neutralized or rationalized away.
Denial is baked into the foundation of American culture. If we consider our foundation to be in
part determined by the artifact of the declaration of independence, especially the phrase “life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” we can examine what kinds of roots it may hold of our
collective denial. An aspirational phrase, “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” delineates
good from bad: we want life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and we don’t want death,
bondage or suffering. This aspiration, however, was intended only for white, land-owning men.
The occurrence of denial here is twofold: it is the refusal of granting these ideals for anyone who
was not in this category of people, and at the same time, a covering up of that fact by using
universalizing language. Denial has a way of covering its own tracks; denying that denial has
happened.
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Although there are myriad artifacts of United States culture that could demonstrate our
flair for denial, this phrase captures something important. The way we have taken up this phrase
as a central motto to explain who we are and what our values are as a nation casts light on some
of our shadows. It is not a coincidence that evidence of this phrase’s opposite—death, bondage,
and suffering—is kept hidden, if not outright denied in our culture. Indeed, our use of death,
bondage, and suffering as tools to colonize Indigenous peoples and enslave Africans made the
founding of the United States possible. Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote, “Our nation was born in
genocide… We are perhaps the only nation which tried as a matter of national policy to wipe out
its Indigenous population” (2000, p. 110). This fact is mostly denied, forgotten about, or painted
over with a rosy hue. Historian Wai-Chee Dimock quotes from nonfiction sources in the time of
Andrew Jackson’s presidency: “whereas European powers ‘conquer only to enslave,’ America,
being ‘a free nation,’ ‘conquers only to bestow freedom.’ … Far from being antagonistic,
‘empire’ and ‘liberty’ are instrumentally conjoined.” (Dimock, 1989, p. 9). Denial in the national
consciousness of the US functions as an important psychological device that turns genocide into
a means of liberation, “reconciling empire and liberty—based on the violent taking of Indigenous
lands—into a usable myth allowed for the emergence of an enduring populist imperialism.”
(Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014, p. 106).
Sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel wrote, “the past is also part of a social reality that, while
far from being absolutely objective, nonetheless transcends our subjectivity and is commonly
shared by others as well” (1996, p. 283). The social reality, particularly established and
maintained by the ruling class of the United States through educational, political, and media
programs, uses denial strategically. “The study of national history is a major part of the general
effort of the modern state to foster a national identity.” (Zerubavel, 1996, pp. 290-291). For
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example, in late 2020 as I drafted this dissertation, an article was published in the Washington
Post describing former President Trump’s plans to modify standards of how history is taught in
public schools in the US: “Trump said he would create a national commission to promote a ‘proAmerican curriculum that celebrates the truth about our nation’s great history,’ which he said
would encourage educators to teach students about the ‘miracle of American history,’ […]
casting any criticism of the United States, even of slavery, as unpatriotic” (Balingit & Meckler,
2020). Here, acknowledgement of any inhumane practices on behalf of the United States
Government would be seen as unpatriotic even in a classroom setting. Denial of particular
histories is often used as a strategy to advance particular ideologies.
Cohen identified that “each variant of denial appears in the official discourse: literal
(nothing happened); interpretive (what happened is really something else) and implicatory (what
happened is justified). […] The contradictory elements form a deep structure: their relationship
to each other is ideological, rather than logical” (S. Cohen, 2013, p. 103). In the above example,
Trump literally denied that the US was founded through the labor of slavery, calling it instead “a
miracle,” while simultaneously interpreting the fact of slavery as justified and implying that it
would therefore be unpatriotic to criticize slavery. The three forms of denial are delivered
together, supporting an ideology of nationalism. This strategy of denial linked with ideology
makes it so that those who acknowledge the fact of slavery and the moral implication of our
country having done harm via the institution of slavery, become cast as outsiders and even as
enemies to the identity of being an American.
Denial here is used as a mechanism to define the borders of national identity. Denial aims
to maintain coherence of an identity, even a national identity, by eliminating information that
puts any part of that identity into question. “Remembering, after all, is more than just a
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spontaneous personal act. It is also regulated by unmistakably social rules of remembrance that
tell us quite specifically what we should remember and what we can or must forget” (Zerubavel,
1996, p. 286). American denialism is particularly invested in the denial of accountability for
causing harm, which prevents any meaningful reparations or changes in behavior from occurring.
Eviatar Zerubavel wrote, “society delineates the scope of our attention and concern, it also
delimits our mental reach into the past by setting certain historical horizons beyond which past
events are basically regarded as irrelevant and, as such, often forgotten altogether” (1996, p.
286). This is maintained in the United States through legal and economic structures, in which
“individual responsibility could be masked in corporate personality… a legal abstraction”
(Miner, 1976, p. xi,). The structure of public roles, such as a professional or a political title, acts
as a shield from personal accountability, bolstering outright denial through limitations of
responsibility protected by the division between one’s professional and personal personas. This,
importantly, is what Hannah Arendt (1963) described as the “banality of evil” that allowed the
atrocities of the holocaust to take place: because people followed the orders of their job duties
they could deny personal responsibility.
There is a crucial parallel between the phenomenology of denial in people with
Alzheimer’s disease and the phenomenology of cultural denial. When denial says, “That did not
happen,” it re-writes our shared memory of a time and a place, re-configuring it. Part of what is
painful about loving somebody who has Alzheimer’s disease is what happens when your own
mental rendition of reality does not map onto theirs in the same way that it used to. In the story
that precedes this section, I described how painful it was to not exist in a shared reality with my
Mom about the devastating fact that she had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. That
experience happened within the social context of a society that is profoundly individualistic,
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which in this example had the effect of minimizing or overlooking how dysregulating and
upsetting it feels to not have a shared sense of reality with others, particularly parents and other
early attachment figures. Therein lies the fallout of denial: a severing of connection.
We form attachments not only with our caregivers, lovers and children, but also with our
cultures, the histories we inherit, the land we live on, the air we breathe, the water we drink. Life
is public and intimate everywhere. Denial aims to protect an internal coherence of any identity –
be it personal, familial, or cultural – by rupturing connection with any person or fact that
represents something that could be threatening to that internal coherence. Because we are deeply
intersubjectively organized, when someone or something we have attachments to claims a
different version of reality than the one we think we are in, we have a choice: maintain the
attachment and leave our understanding of reality, or sever (or at least create a boundary in) the
attachment and preserve our own understanding of reality. In the case with my Mom, at times I
joined her in her lived lifeworld when she was living with Alzheimer’s, I left my own
understanding of reality (which I will discuss in the “Timeless Time and Moving Spirits”
chapter), an experience that was both painful and, at times, rewarding.
Our attachments to history, culture, place, and to one another are all relevant to the
Anthropocene. Climate chaos is a result of the sociopolitical structures that have been driven by
colonization and capitalism, the sociopolitical structures that we and our ancestors for many
generations have called home, despite the persistent alienation and disconnection these structures
have created. Climate chaos is an existential threat in multiple ways: most obviously with
ecosystem collapse that threatens agricultural production, and with the changes in climate
making highly populated terrains uninhabitable. But the existential threat has a trickle-down
effect: not only is our daily sustenance and shelter threatened, so too are our relationships to the
47

histories, cultures, and people we are attached to as well. Denial of the catastrophic anxiety it can
produce to feel your whole lifeworld threatened is a predictable response.
Understanding the mechanics of denial, and its relationship to attachment and supporting
a felt sense of internal coherence can also help us navigate a society that uses denial strategically
to cover over harm done in the era of the Anthropocene, both historically and in the present day.
What people with Alzheimer’s disease can teach us about navigating this existential threat
brought about by the Anthropocene is that it is most important to focus on the underlying
emotion – existential anxiety that threatens to sever our connection with our primary attachments
to people, place, and our sense of self. Offering connection, resonance, and love can be a
powerful antidote to denial. When working with institutional denial, creating these conditions
means generating visions for the future that involve radical, inclusive transformation rather than
staying in a place of critiquing the present and past. While critique is an important practice of
inquiry and understanding, it is not the most effective cognitive / affective strategy for generating
change among people and institutions in denial (Sedgwick, 2003). Indeed, the institutions that
have generated the conditions of the Anthropocene have used disconnection strategically as a
way to accumulate power, and denial as a way of maintaining those power differences. Silvia
Federici (2018) wrote that our embodied love of and attachment to the world has been disrupted
by these institutions. She described how millions of years of human evolution and adaptation to
the natural world have generated in us certain needs for survival that also constitute our main
sources of resistance to exploitation. Her evocative words here are worth quoting directly: “I
refer to our need for the sun, the wind, the sky, the need for touching, smelling, sleeping, making
love, and being in the open air” (Federici, 2018, p. 190). She explains that these needs are
precisely why colonial capitalism has waged a war against our bodies, with greater violence
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against those whose domination is most required for the reproduction of our society. Moving
toward connection, supporting attachment, offering resonance, generating visions of abundance
and connection for the future – these are all strategies of working with denial that address the
underlying affect and bolster a way of being in the world that resists the ideologies that
reproduce the conditions of the Anthropocene.
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Chapter 3: Things: An Ellipsis and a Gathering

It is 2018, and my Mom is living with my Dad in Tucson, AZ, solidly in the “advanced”
stage of Alzheimer’s disease. My Mom sits down to the dining table wherever my Dad tells her
is her spot, and we eat burritos together. Bean and cheese burritos with lettuce and tomatoes were
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my favorite food growing up, and I welcome the nostalgic meal during my visit to my parents in
Tucson from my home in Pittsburgh. My Mom used to pack homemade burritos for me in my
school lunches, and we’d eat them for dinner almost weekly. A casual food, we assembled them
at the dining table from small bowls of toppings and ate them with our hands. Only now, my
Mom eats hers with a knife and fork. She holds the silverware diligently, though with a gestural
awkwardness that conveys that she is working through an experiment of how best to get the food
to her mouth. She tries holding the fork between her thumb, index and middle fingers, then
switches over to holding it in a fist. She saws the burrito with the dull knife, back and forth again
and again, approaching her task tentatively. She seems to be aware she is doing something
different than the rest of us, but perhaps is so consumed with the task at hand that the social
awareness just lends an extra layer of stress rather than act as a clue to look at how my Dad and I
were approaching the task. Maybe she has forgotten that burritos are normally eaten with hands,
or maybe she hasn’t identified it as a burrito at all. That she opted for the fork and knife calls
back to her social etiquette: she is following a general social norm of using utensils. As someone
who grew up working class in a fishing town in Alaska and then became an upper class, glassshattering businesswoman, her social etiquette and defaulting toward something formal strikes
me as a socially-conscious strategy, despite her tentative grip on the utensils.
My Dad encourages her to pick the burrito up with her hands and try eating it that way.
She darts her eyes at him playfully like he’s suggesting something absurd but notices his earnest
expression and decides he is serious. She tries, very slowly, to pick up her burrito. It is a
challenge to hold it so that the toppings don’t slide out the end, and again, she approaches this
tentatively. She takes a bite and puts the burrito back on her plate. Everything that my Mom does
now is slow and deliberate. By the time she has taken a few bites, my Dad and I have both
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finished our burritos, and we sit and talk at the table while my Mom continues eating. She
switches back to using her utensils, and this time my Dad does not encourage her otherwise.
Things Forget Her
The things with which my Mom tethered herself to the world were shaking themselves
free from the webbing of her being-field, including the missing word denoted with a colon in the
note written by my Mom, pictured above, which reads: “there are several misplaced: please call
my hose.” Eva Simms wrote of the worlding power of things: “things are deeply woven into the
structures of the human body, and […] determine locations in the web of lived space” (Simms,
2008, p. 82). When things pulled their threads from the webbing of my Mom’s lifeworld, she
seemed to encounter them with more slack in the line, from farther away, and she worked to
hone her focus on them with that much more energy, in an attempt to figure the thing out and to
thwart the attentional demands of myriad other chaotic things in her sensorial reach. As things
became untethered, missing things left an ellipsis and new things were gathered by emotional
meaning.
The fork in this vignette seemed to conceal from my Mom its utilitarian history. What
once she handled fluently and without consideration, required incredible cognitive attention and
experimentation to master. The fork did not disclose to her the way it used to fit into her hand; it
became mysterious. Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote, “the things of the world are not simply
neutral objects which stand before us for our contemplation. Each one of them symbolizes or
recalls a particular way of behaving, provoking in us reactions which are either favorable or
unfavorable” (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, pp. 48, bold emphasis added). Memory is a reciprocal
process spread throughout our lifeworld, rather than contained inside the brain. However, when
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the chiasmic pathways of recollection are fragmented and begin to unwind, the things of the
world can provoke reactions of frustration, desperation, and innovation.
As my Mom lost mastery over the fork, the fork became more of a thing than an object; it
regained its thingness and dislodged itself from my Mom’s field of mastery, and she was forced
to contend with it anew. This distinction between “thing” and “object” may seem minute, but the
meanings associated with these words are important to tease apart. I refer to “things” as having a
kind of animacy, which David Abram argued characterizes how people “spontaneously
experience them, prior to all our conceptualizations and definitions” (1996, p. 56). Things
express themselves sensuously, act as “a dynamic presence that confronts us and draws us into
relation” (Abram, 1996, p. 56). Objects, on the other hand, are experienced conceptually rather
than sensuously; they are domesticated in a sense. There is a benefit to objectification: it makes it
much easier to use an object as a tool to accomplish a task. Experiencing the sensuous presence
of a fork makes the task of eating much slower and experimental. On the other hand,
approaching the fork as an object which acts as an extension of the self to accomplish the task of
eating with some fluidity means bypassing the sensuousness of the fork itself, perhaps to focus
on the sensuous experience of the food the fork is carrying.
In a neurotypical person, there is some degree of control and intension in how we may
objectify things or encounter their thingness in a dynamic and animated reciprocal relationship,
although this is highly mediated by culture. There is some intentionality behind allowing a piece
of art “speak” to us, by quieting the analytical mind and opening the body to the perceptual field
of the piece of art, allowing ourselves to receive and be impacted by the thing that we are
engaging with our senses. In other situations, we can look at an animate landscape and imagine
the objects waiting for our exploitation through practices like resource extraction. The world
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around us, for the most part, is animate. Air, water, land, not to mention mosquitos and moose
and daffodils, are all animate. Switching between an objectifying and a relational mode of
perception is not dependent on the things themselves but relates more to how a person orients
within particular cultural norms.
Indeed, US culture is one that values utilitarian objectification above the sensuous,
relational perception that sees the animacy of things. We educate our children to be analytical
thinkers who prioritize use-value and reward them when their default mode of perception is one
of objectification. Socializing children into our society involves a steady insistence that they
learn to be productive within a capitalist economy, which is reproduced through the processes of
objectification and commodification. A relational way of perceiving involves recognizing the
animacy of other beings and respects their autonomy within reciprocal connection. Relational
perception is undervalued in the US and in many other cultures influenced by the logic of
colonization and capitalism across the world; it is in direct opposition to the objectification that
propels a capitalist economy forward. And as these systems have created the Anthropocene, an
objectifying perception of the world is at the heart of what reproduces the era in which we have
created the conditions for the annihilation of our own species. This is where the systems get
under our skin, and our bodies and ways of perceiving become conduits for the larger systems of
which we are a part.
Robin Wall Kimmerer connects our economy with our language in her book, Braiding
Sweetgrass: Indigenous wisdom, scientific knowledge, and the teachings of the plants (2013).
She wrote that the capitalist economy, which is characterized by commodity exchange in which a
person’s relationship to the seller and to the commodity is essentially limited to the moment of
transaction, fits with the English language, which lacks grammar, especially pronouns, to refer to
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things as animate. Wall Kimmerer wrote: “English doesn’t give us many tools for incorporating
respect for animacy. In English, you are either a human or a thing. Our grammar boxes us in by
the choice of reducing a nonhuman being to an it, or it must be gendered, inappropriately, as a he
or a she. Where are our words for the simple existence of another living being?” (2013, p. 56).
Note that she uses the word “thing” here how I have defined the term “object” above. Kimmerer
is situated biculturally and compares US culture with her Potawatomi indigenous culture, and her
use of the word “thing” here helps illustrate that the English language has a poverty of animacy
to it. Perhaps for some Western scholars like myself, the word “thing” is a step toward animacy
from the word “objective,” but it is still a subdued gesture toward the animacy that lives in other,
especially indigenous, languages.
While Kimmerer especially emphasizes the deleterious impact the lack of animacy
reflected in our language and our economy has on the rest of the living world, from mammals to
insects to the rivers themselves, as we objectify and cause harm to these living beings and
ecosystems, there is something still relevant here to inanimate objects like the fork my Mom was
contending with in the previous vignette. The utilitarian or objectifying way of perceiving was
not something my Mom could recall in that moment. It was like a horse whose saddle was taken
off. The utensils seemed to have their own intentionality, as if the utensils themselves had
forgotten how to obey my Mom’s will. Unwieldy reciprocity entered into the equation as my
Mom fumbled with the utensils, seeming to be asking in her gentle and tentative gestures how
the utensils might like to be involved in her project of eating a burrito.
Importantly, this vignette intersects with how my Mom was perceived through a lens of
pathology by medical professionals as well as others in her life, including myself. The result of
this shift in her perception made her approach the task of eating much slower than she used to
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and using a different method than what we perceive as “normal.” From the cultural vantage point
of the US, and more specifically from the “anatomo-clinical gaze” (D. H. Davis, 2004, p. 370),
my Mom’s engagement with the utensils in this vignette was indicative of her pathology. The
“anatomo-clinical gaze” refers to a historically situated interpretation of illness: “a previous
understanding of disease was as imbalances and disequilibria, contra the natural body, the gaze
now revealed disease as residing within the natural body” (D. H. Davis, 2004, p. 370). This
indicates the body is read as being ill, the person themself as abnormal, and is itself a form of
objectification. The anatomo-clinical gaze can itself be seen as a symptom of the Anthropocene.
And certainly, it was indicative of her deviation from the norm, including her own norm from
years earlier in how she approached the task of eating. However, this is a deficit-focused
interpretation that lacks any explanation about what her lived experience of using the utensils
might have actually been. Although I can only offer these thoughts as a possibility, having only
my own lived experience of being with my Mom during her experience of Alzheimer’s to draw
on, they offer another perspective that may be less pathologizing, and which draw attention to the
hegemony of our “hypercognitive” culture (Post, 2000), and its relation to the Anthropocene.
What then, can our forgetful elders teach us about being, forgetting and dying in the
Anthropocene? They can remind us of the animacy of the world around us, which we may have
lost sight of (or never experienced in the first place) due to our socialization in political and
economic systems which actively work against and encourage us to forget about being in the
world in this way. The ways in which my Mom reminded me of the animacy of the world felt
both riveting and disturbing, as I came up against my own disconnection from the animacy of the
world.
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Chapter 4: Timeless Time and Moving Spirits
Did you know your heart has a door?
Did you know your heart is a hollowed-out conch shell, a swirling entryway, around into
the safe center?
Did you know your mama built the walls of your heart with her body?
Did you know she used her spirit to build the pathway into your heart?
Did you know she kept her spirit in your heart even after you were born?
Like a sea anemone’s tentacle, she tethered her spirit to your heart.
Six years ago, while running through the woods on Cougar Mountain, outside of Seattle,
an overwhelming feeling of simultaneous ecstasy and crushing sorrow came over me as I sensed
powerfully through my spirit. My Mom was beginning her transition away from this life,
entering the liminal space between this world and the next, and I felt that transition physically
through her spirit slipping out from my body. It was like an out of body experience, as if I were
watching it happen from above the tree line, while I simultaneously felt totally embedded in the
sensations in my body, which were all pleasurably humming in harmony as I glided through the
woods. I knew: when she dies, a part of me will die, too; the part her that is in me. This
revelation cut through my sense of past and future, and I felt as though I could run forever.
Visions of My Grandparents
A couple of years later, I again had a physical feeling in my chest of my Mom’s spirit
receding from my body. I recognized the feeling from that time on Cougar Mountain, and I
spoke with my therapist about it. She guided me through a journey, one of facilitating the
receding of my Mom’s spirit from my heart: sending her spirit back to her with gratitude and a
blessing, so that she may have all the energetic resources she needs for her transition. Working
with the physical sensations of her receding energy from my chest, I escorted it, holding it with
deep gratitude and love, and visualized sending it across space to where she was sitting in her
home in Tucson. My therapist guided me to send her energy back into her heart, and when my
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vision took me to where she sat, I was astonished to see my Nana standing behind my Mom,
braiding her hair. Then I saw her father there, who was her rock in life, a man I never met but
whose spirit I have felt deeply connected to since I was a child. Crowding behind them were my
Mom’s aunts and uncles, grandmothers, grandfathers, and other ancestors all fanning out in the
room behind my Mom.
I was stunned. My Mom had for over a year been talking about her parents as if they
were still alive. She would ask me to be sure that they had gotten home okay, or that they had
found some dinner to eat, lamenting that she could not cook for them that day. I encountered
these conversations uncomfortably. I had learned the popular adage in communicating with
people who have Alzheimer’s, a new philosophy in the field: validate whatever reality they share
with you. And so, I would comfort my Mom, telling her that I had spoken with them and that
they are home safely, cozy and warm. But when I told her those things, I experienced internally
an incredible discord, and a horrible feeling of lying to my Mom, that left me questioning
whether she could hear my deceit through my words. Furthermore, I felt like I was betraying my
own reality to do so, in a way that felt violent to the validity of my own experience. I felt
incredible conflict over this idea: do I negate my reality to join her in hers? Or do I negate her
reality to hope to have her join mine? As her daughter, my sense of reality at its core is what she
has validated for me over my lifetime. To have her join into my reality, to meet me where I was
at, provided one of the most fundamental feelings of love and safety I have had access to in my
lifetime. The stakes of this conundrum felt dire, and tormented me for over a year.
And then: there they were. I saw them. I saw her parents there with her! Our realities met,
and neither were neglected in that moment, despite being thousands of miles apart. I experienced
the reality of her perception by engaging with her on a spiritual level. And I saw that her parents
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are present with her, along with a whole host of other ancestors. Mom called them to be present,
for they are her guides and her comforts in her long journey through the liminal space of
Alzheimer’s, from this world to the next.
Co-Existentiality
The mother’s body is the first house of being, a shadowy and round abode for the
unborn. A great paradox rules pregnancy: are there two bodies or one? Two
beings or one?
- Simms, 2008, p. 14
My position of co-existentiality with my Mom is deeply woven into my being. My life
started with hers, and the most basic contours of my sense of the world begin with how she wove
me into existence inside her body. “The deep space of the womb is the first place in which the
senses awaken” (Simms, 2008, pp. 30, italics in the original). The context of the experiences I
described in “Timeless Time and Moving Spirits” is grounded in my co-existentiality with my
Mom. Her embodied consciousness was an invitation into the world at the beginning of my life.
At the end of her life, she invited me to experience another, more spiritual, world through my
own embodied consciousness.
Co-existentiality is a concept which indicates an inherent being-with; a fundamental
permeability of my being with other beings, especially the particular beings you grew up with; it
describes an ontological interdependence. It challenges the idea that a person is an isolated
monad operating in a world of other isolated monads, where interaction is transactional between
separate and whole individuals. As Simms indicated, co-existentiality describes that our
perception of the world is immediately and necessarily constructed by our relational experiences
with other beings; indeed, our sensory organs are developed in the context of our relational
experiences. Without a relational context, babies tend to fail to thrive, and can develop sensory
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integration disorders, literally unable to perceive and sense the world appropriately (Simms,
2008, p. 86). Likewise, researchers have “found that people who lived alone or who were no
longer married were between 70% and 80% more likely to develop dementia than those who
lived with others or who were married” (Gabbard, 2014, p. 391). Consciousness, perception, and
memory are relational phenomena, and when we are removed from relational situations
developmental delays or even atrophy can occur. Co-existentiality invites us into being. As this
chapter seeks to uncover the theoretical underpinnings of the stories I related in the previous
chapter about Timeless Time and Moving Spirits, I explore how my embodied consciousness
was tethered, fundamentally, with that of my Mom’s.
The concept of co-existentiality is remembered by Western feminist thinkers, recovered
from a philosophical inheritance of Cartesian philosophy, and never forgotten in indigenous
ways of knowing despite centuries of colonial repression, theft and genocide (Todd, 2016).
Cartesian dualism covered over co-existentiality by identifying thinking with being, famously
with the phrase, “I think, therefore I am.” Cartesian philosophy leaves no room for consciousness
to be intertwined, bigger than the body of an individual person. The philosophical tradition of
phenomenology began to recover a relational perspective, that being-in-the-world is
fundamentally being in relationship with the world, and that our sensory organs weave us into
the world, giving us a field of being that exceeds the boundary of our skin, but is nonetheless
rooted in the body. Maurice Merleau-Ponty critiqued the Cartesian vision of scientific inquiry for
attempting to be “an absolute observer who is equally close to them all, a medium without a
point of view, without body and without spatial position - in sum, the medium of pure intellect”
(Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 41).
Embodiment is the ground of our existence, and while there is a simplicity to this fact –
60

indeed, we live in it every day – there are complex philosophical understandings of embodiment
that substantially effect the way we live. Maurice Merleau-Ponty understood embodiment as the
seat of consciousness. He discussed ideas such as body schema, intentionality, and perception as
the way in which we are directed toward the world through our embodiment. In the
Phenomenology of Perception (2002), he proposed that our ability to perceive through our senses
has led some–particularly in the history of Western philosophy–to believe that our bodies are
objects, or that consciousness is essentially an activity of the mind that is independent of the
body. He suggested that rather than being an object, the body exists as a being-toward-the-world.
The concept of “body schema” is helpful in understanding this, as Merleau-Ponty (2002)
described that our bodies move not by some calculated formula thought through in advance, but
as a fluid, coherent yet permeable whole in the direction of our goals. “Intentionality” is a term
that he used to describe that consciousness is not a cognitive process, but a process of our bodies
moving toward the world; put in simpler terms, he said: “consciousness is originarily [sic] not an
‘I think that,’ but rather an ‘I can’” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 139). Our embodiment in the world
is where consciousness arises, not the mind as a separate thing from the body, and it arises
through engaging with the world. His concept of embodied consciousness deconstructs the
binary of mind/body. While thinking, experienced as an internal monologue, may be understood
as another type of consciousness, Merleau-Ponty argued that our more fundamental level of
existence from which all else arises is our embodied consciousness.
Embodied consciousness arises in interaction with the world around it, as this has deep
implications for understanding being-in-the-world. When we return to the body as the seat of
consciousness, we return also to the lived history of that body, as a body who was born out of
another body, who was nourished by another body, who learned to direct their intentionality
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toward the world within the harbor of a relational field. The body schema is not just an
experience of the body, but of the body in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2002). In his essay, “The
Intertwining–The Chiasm,” Merleau-Ponty (1968) described how embodied consciousness is
chiasmically woven into the world, as our senses are shaped by what we perceive, and vice
versa. What we perceive is shaped by our sensing it, such that the seer and the visible become
indistinguishable from one another in their reciprocal structure (Merleau-Ponty, 1968). The
space between seer and the visible is what Merleau-Ponty described as “flesh,” the alive,
reciprocal contact that is the “means of communication” between seer and the visible (MerleauPonty, 1968, p. 135). I think of his idea of “flesh” as a way of indicating that the relational field
is animate and is life-giving and consciousness-fostering. It is the field that we are neither
completely enveloped in nor separate from; it is the co-existential framework of our becoming.
Indeed, Eva Simms (2008) wrote in conversation with Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on
embodiment that cognitive thinking is a capacity that develops throughout early childhood, and
infants experience an immersion in their bodily perceptions that is unmediated by cognition, such
that an infant is “not merely in the world but is the world” (p. 22). She continued, noting that
adults typically experience some awareness of the difference between themselves and the world
they’re immersed in, but nonetheless are bodily immersed in the world. It is as if cognition
mediates our being-world. In the structure of the phrase, “being-in-the-world,” we might
understand “in-the” to be the work of cognition. Chiasmically interwoven, Merleau-Ponty wrote,
“we are the world that thinks itself […] the world is at the heart of our flesh” (1968, p. 136).
Observing the developmental trajectory of infants and young children reveals a particular
ontological organization; one that is interdependent. Pregnancy is perhaps the most tangible
example that challenges the dualism of Cartesian philosophy, and even the existential62

phenomenological thinkers that critique Cartesianism, such as Merleau-Ponty, fail to fully
articulate co-existentiality (Young, 2005, p. 47). The concept upends the post-enlightenment
philosophy that articulates a form of individualism that has informed the socioeconomic
structures, political ideology, and framework of ethics in the West for hundreds of years. Iris
Marion Young wrote: “pregnancy challenges the integration of my body experience by rendering
fluid the boundary between what is within, myself, and what is outside, separate. I experience
my insides as the space of another, yet my own body” (2005, p. 49). Pregnancy is only a very
tangible and literal example, which Simms expands upon by describing the co-existentiality of
infants with their caregivers, especially through breastfeeding. She wrote: “Milk reveals to us
that the body, even in its organic dimension, is not enclosed in itself but is engaged in a
meaningful web of relations. […] Perhaps more than any other substance milk is the visible sign
of the invisible, the in-between body, the chiasm, the flesh of mother and infant” (Simms, 2008,
p. 15). In the stories related in “Timeless Time and Moving Spirits,” there is a folding over of my
Mom’s consciousness into my own in which a meaningful web of relations from her embodied
memory, and her inherited embodied memories, were revealed.
Embodied consciousness does not exist cut off from the past or future, in some kind of
stark series of disconnected present moments. Rather, there is a flow from moment to moment,
where the preceding moment is not forgotten, but is integrated into the present. Embodied
consciousness involves a gathering up of time, as a being-toward-the-world is also a movement
toward a future. Merleau-Ponty described that the body inhabits time and space (2002, pp.140141). That is, space and time are not the coordinates in which we are abstractly located, but it is
though time and space that embodied consciousness exists at all. Embodied memory therefore is
a matter of living the past again through the present of the body. While some describe explicit, or
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cognitive, memory as a kind of projection from the present into the past (Fuchs, 2012), I would
argue that even our explicit memories (such as recalling the name of an old friend) are actually
embodied, and are experienced bodily as a kind of “time travel,” where explicit memories can
wash over us and conjure again the sensations of all that is tethered to that cognitive association.
Paul Ricoeur (2004) suggested that because human experience is not limited to cognition,
neither is memory. If embodied consciousness is about the body in relation to the world, the
same must be true of embodied memory. Embodied memory is our “lived past,” in which the
body’s experiences, “anchored in body memory, spread out and connect with the environment
like an invisible network, which relates us to things and to people” (Fuchs, 2012, p. 11). The
body is permeable to the world in which it lives, and memory mediates that permeability,
tethering us to places and other beings with whom we are bonded, anchoring our identity and
providing a springboard for our actions. Edward Casey wrote that to remember “is to become
enmeshed in the thicket of the past,” which he argues supports being an “autonomous agent in
the world,” as an act of recognizing loved ones “consolidates social bonds that empower me in
various ways” (Casey, 2009, p. 548). Here, autonomy may best be interpreted to mean the ability
to act free from coercion – not independently, but interdependently. Indeed, it is our
interdependence that makes autonomous action possible, a fact that is often covered over in our
hyper-individualistic culture, another symptom of the Anthropocene.
This is clarified with a reflection on our lived experience: memories sometimes seem to
occur randomly to us, but more often than not they are conjured by some stimulus in our
environment. When I see an old friend, memories of times past and the ease in my body I
immediately feel with her offer themselves over to me without conscious effort on my part.
Sensing ease and connection, I feel welcomed and able to extend myself, to act with confidence.
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The world holds our memories, and it is our chiasmic interwovenness with the world where
memories are offered over to us. Memory is not simply an activity of the brain, though the brain,
being an organ that is highly responsive to the environment, is involved. I would argue rather
that memory is made possible because of our chiasmic relation to the world. There is a reciprocal
exchange of embodied memory between the world and us.
Although intersubjectivity may be a part of our being-in-the-world, I believe it goes
beyond the dyadic structure of person-to-person that the word “intersubjectivity” suggests, but
rather encompasses a world. Merleau-Ponty’s description of being the world and the world being
us may be a radical departure within Western philosophy, but resonates deeply with many
indigenous epistemologies across the world (Todd, 2016; Kimmerer, 2013). This sociohistorical
philosophical comparison is an important indicator of what colonizing cultures may forget in
their move to dominate and extract, including such epistemologies in the first place, which were
partially recovered by Merleau-Ponty (with help from his predecessors like Husserl and
Heidegger) only by thinking through embodiment.
Cultural Ways of Knowing
Indeed, while Merleau-Ponty beautifully describes the embodied consciousness that is
born out of our movement toward and chiasmic reciprocity with the world, he does little to
interpret the specificity of the sociocultural world with which we are in reciprocal relationship. It
is worth looking at memory from another side: the sociocultural and ecological specificity of the
world we are woven into. Culture is a kind of intergenerational collective memory system. We
pass down knowledge from one generation to the next through culture, and our memories of how
we have survived become the map for the future generation to live from. Some of this is the
explicit knowledge we are taught in schools and at home, but it also is the implicit knowledge of
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the “habitus.” Examining the sociocultural context by way of embodiment can be helped along
by Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of “habitus,” which addresses how our bodily practices are
influenced by the cultures in which we are socialized. Habitus describes an embodied, prereflective dimension of our existence which originates in the culture (Csordas, 2015). Habitus
explains the harmony of cultural dispositions among groups of people without people
consciously referring back to a norm – these are the cultural norms that we embody without
needing to think about it (Kontos, 2004). My own habitus may explain why I anticipate that the
stories related in “Timeless Time and Moving Spirits” will not be readily understood by people
situated in my cultural background, and why I am going to great lengths to explore what makes it
real. My cultural habitus does not have a framework to make sense of this kind of experience.
Our relationship to culture is fundamentally facilitated with communication, including
language, behavior and aesthetics. David Abram (1996) described the history of the modern
alphabet and traces how language used to be born out of a reciprocal interaction with the natural
world (e.g. pictorial signs, onomatopoetic words whose sounds mimicked the natural world), but
evolved such that languages that use the Latin alphabet refer only to human-made signs, making
the more-than-human world mostly excluded from our semiotic system. Robin Wall Kimmerer
suggested that this exclusion is evident in our grammar, which reflects how we culturally
structure relationships. She notes that the English language is comprised of only about 30%
verbs, whereas her native language, Potawatomi, is about 70% verbs (Kimmerer, 2013). This is
important because verbs refer to a kind of embodied consciousness, a doing, rather than a static,
disembodied “thing.” She described that in Potawatomi, the word “bay,” a noun in English,
would be translated as “to be a bay,” such that the water is linguistically represented, and
therefore sensorially perceived, as being alive. Our language is an important system of
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sociocultural memory and structures our relationships with the human and non-human world
around us.
When I tell the stories in “Timeless Time and Moving Spirits,” I anticipate that my
audience (Western, academic, and likely disproportionately made up of white settlers due to the
white supremacy that shapes Western academic communities) will hear this as a dream at best or
a delusion at worst, or perhaps a failure of my perception, because our culture, our language, our
ways of knowing, do not interpret these kinds of experiences as animate, real, and spiritual.
What happens when our culture asks us to forget about our bodies and see the natural
world as a commodity, as does our capitalist socioeconomic system in the era of the
Anthropocene, where the needs of our bodies get in the way of the further production of capital
(Federici, 2018)? When the culture asks us to deny our interconnectedness with one another and
with the world? To deny the reality of our being-in-the-world, our being-world at all? Andy
Fisher (2013), writing from a phenomenological ecopsychological perspective, said that it is this
alienation from–or forgetting of–our bodies that replaces our bodily based perception of our own
existence with an intellectual, fantasy-based one that we conceptualize as monologues taking
place in our heads, i.e., Cartesian ways of knowing. Part of what can happen is the loss of a felt
sense of being interdependent, of being permeable to other beings and to places.
It is not as if my Mom transported me through an interdimensional portal like what might
be depicted in a sci-fi film. Something more mundane and literal happened, though it still felt
like a radical departure from how I perceived the world before that experience. It may seem
radical to trust the perception of people living with Alzheimer’s all the time. But when I could be
trustworthy to my Mom – when I improvised along with her perception, stayed with her in
conversation, joined her in her world – surprising gifts emerged. The gift of meeting my
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ancestors was the most profound, and was one that altered my cosmology. Before that
experience, I did not have an experiential relationship with my ancestors; a new spatiotemporal
world opened to me. Simms wrote, “The early anchorage in maternal space remains a keystone
in the depth of our spatial experience in general”(2008, p. 34). In my experience of being with
my Mom while she had Alzheimer’s, she opened up a new spatial experience to me: a spiritual
space. In so doing, she reminded me of my belonging to a lineage of ancestors who will have my
back when I need them.
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Chapter 5: Memories of Horizon
The landscape surrounding my parents’ townhouse spans the spectrum from untouched
desert to meticulously manicured golf course and all the range in between, of concrete, adobe
style cookie-cutter townhouses with uniquely chosen desert flora landscaped to match the
preference of each homeowner. My parents began visiting Tucson years ago, when my Mom
could still drive, when she only had “chemo brain farts,” which were concerning, but seemed
within the range of normal behavior for someone her age who had endured years of
chemotherapy for breast cancer. My parents loved visiting the desert, and in 2016 they finally
moved there, selling their house in Portland, OR. The desert was a new environment for my
Mom, one that she did not live in until after she had Alzheimer’s.
My Mom sat on the couch in the living room of their townhouse for much of her waking
day. Her body adapted to the shape of the overstuffed cushions, which hugged her back side and
reflected her warmth comfortably back onto her skin. From the couch, she did not need to survey
the back of her body for threat from the unfamiliar world in which she dwelled: it was protected,
even as her long sits kept her knees from articulating and lubricating, so they sounded like
crackling logs in a fire when she stood. The couch was a safe and comforting place, where she
was often joined by her dog, a loyal little white fluffball of a companion who she named after her
father, Jasper. The couch was a respite from the increasingly unwieldy and unfamiliar
townhouse. Their townhouse had an open floor plan, so the large living room opened to the
dining room and entryway and looked out on the back patio. It was a lot of space for her to keep
track of at once, and she rediscovered where the hallway led every time she journeyed down it.
What lay beyond her line of sight became unknown, and she filled in the gaps of her memory of
the space with memories of other spaces. She slowly paced back and forth down the hallway,
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looking for the set of stairs that could take her up to her bedroom. Only, in their one-story
townhouse, there were no stairs, a choice my parents made together when they considered where
they would like to live as they became less mobile as they aged.
I recall a visit to Tucson to visit my parents. My Mom looked out the window of their
townhouse at the cacti in their back patio and the great blue skies of southern Arizona. She saw
this horizon, but located herself “up North, with my Dad.” My best guess as to what she meant
by “up North” was near where her parents retired and her father died in 1983, on Camano Island,
Washington. It is a forested coastal area where the sky is overcast most days of the year and
you’re never too far from the Puget Sound. Or perhaps she was locating herself further North and
further back in time to Ketchikan, Alaska, where she grew up amidst the eagles and salmon and
rain. Her father was a fisherman there and the stories my Mom would tell cast him as a
community leader, a barrel-chested generous mischief-maker, who woke her up on the weekends
by pounding out blues songs on the piano.
Although sometimes my Mom would look out at the desert and conjure some other, far
away horizon in her minds-eye, other times she would look out at the golds and reds of Southern
Arizona like a painter. One time she described the sunset to me, looking out on the eastern face
of Pusch Ridge, part of the Santa Catalina mountain range visible from their townhouse in
Tucson: “the mountains go pink, purple.” Something in how she said this – her grammar, but
also her tone – brought the mountains to life. I felt like I was looking at the rounded backs of
giant huddled animals transforming their flesh like chameleons in the magic of the dusk.
Recollection and Dwelling
Memory separates the self from total immersion in the world, giving room for
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consciousness. Emmanuel Levinas wrote in Totality and Infinity (1969) that recollection is “a
suspension of the immediate reactions the world solicits in view of a greater attention to oneself,
one’s possibilities, and the situation” (p. 154). Recollection establishes the “I,” meaning that
“familiarity [a mode of recollection] is an accomplishment, an en-ergy of separation. With it
separation is constituted as dwelling and inhabitation. To exist henceforth means to dwell.” (pp.
155-156). Dwelling therefore entails both a separation from the world and an immersion or
reinsertion within it as a self-conscious being that is made possible through memory.
This process of individual recollection is mirrored collectively, as Simms wrote, “In the
history of human cultures, the founding of a place lies in its differentiation from the
undifferentiated ‘chaos’ around it, which thus establishes a point of orientation and an ordered
world of here and there” (2008, p. 31). Recollection, on both an individual and collective basis,
is a process of drawing a line that establishes the boundary between here and there, me and notme. “The separation that is concretized through the intimacy of the dwelling outlines new
relations with the elements” (Levinas, 1969, p. 156). Memory makes dwelling possible by
maintaining a separation of the self from the not-self, like individual threads preserved in a
woven tapestry. Memory provides the space to sense that distinction, and thus the space to
approach and weave into the field of being, even as memory is made possible by “living from” a
place (Levinas, 1969, p. 153). To stand on the earth and to stand in oneself simultaneously is the
ambiguity of embodiment, and memory maintains that ambiguity. Memory is the dashes that
connect and separate each element of “being-in-the-world.” It bears repeating: “To exist
henceforth means to dwell” (Levinas, 1969, p. 156).
In Western culture, memories are typically described as being “located” inside the brain
of the person who is remembering. However, both Levinas and Simms open the horizon, and
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locate the phenomenon of memory instead in the field of being, beyond the skin of the
individual. Memory as such is comprised of the chiasmic threads that weave a person to her
being-field, housed in and recalled through the matrix of places, people and things themselves.
Memory dwells not in an “interior consciousness,” but is rather the threading that both separates
and situates a person within the field of places, people and things they are surrounded by and
which they gather into a configuration of identity. Dwelling therefore is an act of collecting
again, re-collecting, the pulse of the world, which vibrates through the being who is held separate
from and simultaneously situated within the world with memory.
Specific memories gather a concretized self. A self who has a history, particular likes and
dislikes, particular identities, ideologies, and attachments. However, while specific memories are
totalized concretizations of things that happened in a past chronological time, the faculty of
memory is the thread that weaves us into the field of being. Recollection is the tethering that
dwells us in the world.
Dwelling in Alzheimer’s, Alzheimer’s Embodied
What happens to a person who is losing her memory, if dwelling is an act of recollection?
She becomes unwound from the world, in a sense; the apparent exterior here-and-now may not
match the interior experience of here-and-now. In the vignette at the start of this chapter, my
Mom was physically located in Tucson, and yet she felt as if she were “up North,” in a very
different landscape. This dwelling elsewhere resulted in fissures in a shared lifeworld with the
people around her, even while her embodied selfhood persisted (Kontos, 2012). My Mom
continued to dwell, but the world she located herself within was not always in the here-and-now
that the people around her experienced.
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My Mom sought comforting spaces as her secure position in the webbing of time and
place loosened with the progression of her disease. Her experience of furniture, rooms and
horizons changed as a result. “In a very general way, the key problem of dementia might be
described as the loss of a common shared world of meaning, that is, the loss of a common home”
(Dekkers, 2011, p. 292). If she was losing her place in a “common” home, what was she
experiencing instead? She negotiated a novel world from the compass of her embodied
memories, which became dislodged from their specific positions in the chronological and spatial
history of her life. It must be underscored though that her dwelling in another world, different
from the one experienced by the people around her, was nevertheless a shared lifeworld, a
common home with other beings, most notably her parents, who she often discussed. As the
world around her began to feel unfamiliar, she located herself in another home.
Cradle and Comfort
The home, as a building, belongs to a world of objects. But this belongingness
does not nullify the bearing of the fact that every consideration of objects, and of
buildings too, is produced out of a dwelling.
-Levinas, 1969, pp. 152-153
The place my Mom was in did not adhere to her cognitive schema of her present location.
When my Mom was searching for the stairs to her bedroom in her single-story home, her
embodied memory knew how to get her to a comforting resting place, only the floorplan of their
current home did not match that memory, which arose out of another time and place. Gaston
Bachelard wrote:
But over and beyond our memories, the house we were born in is physically inscribed in
us. It is a group of organic habits. After twenty years, in spite of all the other anonymous
stairways, we would recapture the reflexes of the ‘first stairway,’ we would not stumble
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on that rather high step. The house’s entire being would open up, faithful to our own
being. (1964, 36).
The stairs up to her bedroom, the threshold to where the demands of her waking world could be
temporarily released, were inscribed in my Mom’s body, and she navigated from that felt
compass. She looked again for that threshold, but it took a different and unfamiliar form in this
home, one which she had not been able to incorporate into her embodied schema to recall again
as needed. And so, recollection failed her, and the house in which she lived closed off its
homeliness to her, retracting its hospitable welcome.
My Mom knew, in this example, what function she was looking for: she wanted to find a
place to rest. However, the form of her home did not feel familiar, so she could not trace along
the contours of her house to find her way back to the function she sought. The phenomenological
philosopher of ecology, David Abram, wrote: “The body itself is a kind of place—not a solid
object but a terrain through which things pass, and in which they sometimes settle and sediment”
(Abram, 2011, p. 230). The terrain of my Mom’s embodied consciousness had begun to sift free
those things which had settled, dislodging them from their familiar configurations.
Dwelling with Alzheimer’s
For my Mom, the outside world shuffled, and the horizon she gazed upon could be any
number of horizons from her past. The horizon seemed to be conjured by my Mom’s emotional
stirrings: what felt emotionally relevant was where she felt she resided in space. My Mom’s
tendency to replace the horizon she was looking out at with a meaningful one from her past made
sense as she tried to answer the question: where am I? She answered based on where she felt it
was likely she was, based on where her heart had most been called. The time that she spent
visiting Camano Island, about hour from her home of 30 years in Seattle, was of immense
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emotional magnitude. Her parents retired on Camano Island, and only lived there for a few years,
during which time she gave birth to her first child, my older brother, Steve. Six months later, her
father died from pancreatic cancer, an hour after my Mom promised him that she would take care
of her mother, who was showing signs of developing Alzheimer’s herself.
As her memory of the horizon became conceptually disorganized, my Mom compensated
with poetry to tie together the disintegrating schemas of her cognition. As a result, she
experienced and invited others around her to feel again “the birth of the landscape,” or “the feel
of perceptual experience itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 41). When she said, “the mountains go
pink, purple,” rather than organizing her description from an analytical schema where the
mountains receive the effect of the setting sun, and the origin of change is the sun going below
the horizon, she described how the mountains themselves transform. The specificity of the
mountains, separate from the sunset, animated them, dancing apart from their adherence to the
landscape. Bachelard describes that poetic imagery precedes thought and instead arises from the
soul: ‘‘To specify exactly what a phenomenology of the image can be, to specify that the image
comes before thought, we should have to say that poetry, rather than being a phenomenology of
the mind, is a phenomenology of the soul.” (1994, p. 4). My Mom’s soul recognized the vitality
of the changing mountains. Through my Mom’s poetic gesturing toward the landscape, she
restored the earth with a mystical, alive quality that has often been stripped from it with the
Western perspective of scientific objectivism. David Abram wrote: “The body is […] a sensitive
threshold through which the world experiences itself, a traveling doorway through which sundry
aspects of the earth are always flowing” (2010, p. 230). My Mom’s embodied experience of the
landscape through her position of Alzheimer’s allowed the earth to experience itself once again
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as alive. She also shared that animacy of the earth with the people around her, including me,
giving me a sense of enchantment with the landscape.
Would the experience of place become as dislodged in a person who had been embedded
within a single landscape during their lifetime? I wondered whether the fact that my Mom had
moved so many times to such different landscapes over the course of her life influenced her
experiences of the horizon in Tucson. Moving between such varied landscapes of Alaska,
Washington, Oregon, and Arizona was available to my Mom because of her upward class
mobility throughout her lifetime. But for many people in other cultural and socioeconomic
locations, they might live with the same horizon for their whole lives. Although my parents
enjoyed the warmth of the desert and chose to live there, it is possible that their moves to
different landscapes provoked more disorientation for my Mom as she had Alzheimer’s.
Connection to place can invoke a feeling of belonging whereby one can “feel at home”; it is “a
landscape of memory, thought and imagination” (hooks, 2009, p. 221). As Yi-Fu Tuan argued,
we strengthen our sense of self by accessing our imaginative and material past; objects anchor
time, and place, though shifting, allows us to recapture our personal history (1977, p. 187). As
my Mom faced insecurity about her sense of self in a place she had only lived in with
Alzheimer’s—that is, a place she struggled to create new memories of belonging to due to the
disease making it difficult to consolidate new memories in general—she found a strengthened
sense of self in her memories of other places to which she used to feel a sense of belonging.
Finding belonging in a shifting horizon is an ontological skill that will serve us well as
we navigate the climate crisis of the Anthropocene. As the places we dwell in and are attached to
undergo increasingly rapid changes in flora and fauna, including more frequent and intense
dramatic events such as wildfires and hurricanes, our ability to root into a felt sense of being at
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home when the world around us feels unfamiliar will be crucial for our survival. Our most
forgetful elders show us that even when profoundly disoriented, it is possible to anchor into a felt
sense of being at home in the horizons we have dwelled in throughout our lives.
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Chapter 6: Take Me on a Long Walk off a Short Dock
My Mom’s mother, who my brother and I called Nana, had Alzheimer’s, too. She
eventually died from the disease when I was 10 years old, and I don’t have any memory of Nana
without Alzheimer’s – that was how I always knew her. My Mom was Nana’s primary caretaker,
as her father died from cancer very early on in the course of Nana’s illness, and my Mom was an
only child. My Mom tried to preserve her mother’s independence for as long as possible, and
Nana lived in her own house in our neighborhood when I was a little girl. My Mom would cook
for her and do her laundry, on top of having two small children and a demanding job. When we
would visit Nana at her house, my Mom would enlist me to crawl under the bed and recover the
silverware and other trinkets that Nana would hide there. She thought that people were trying to
steal her belongings, so she would hide them under the bed, between the couch cushions, and in
other unexpected nooks and crannies throughout her home. I took pleasure in searching for these
things; it was a scavenger hunt that was helpful to my Mom.
After a small fire in Nana’s house when she forgot to turn the stove off, my parents
moved Nana into our house. I was young, and I don’t have many memories from the time when
she lived with us. After a while, my parents moved Nana into an assisted living home in a suburb
of Seattle. Despite being able to afford their laundry services, my Mom elected to continue doing
her laundry every week, as a way to stay in relationship and regular contact despite the long
drive. Naturally, my Mom felt ambivalence about visiting Nana; it was painful. Doing her
laundry kept her accountable to making frequent visits. It wore my Mom out.
My memories of Nana are mostly of visiting her at the assisted living home. I didn’t like
going there, but I liked spending time with my Mom on the drive. Nana lived in the locked
memory care wing of the large facility, the kind you needed to type in a code to get through the
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door. The place smelled like canned green beans, stale humidity and baby powder. Sometimes I
would breathe through my mouth while I was there to avoid smelling it. Nana didn’t talk much,
and when she did, it was difficult to follow, her words trailing off, falling in a pile off to the side.
I could sense that she was confused, and sometimes irritated or upset, but she couldn’t explain
why. As a young child, I couldn’t understand why she might have felt those things. I feared her
cloudy and upset affect. Sometimes, though, I would sit near Nana and we would lock eyes, and
it would feel like we were connected. Her eyes could smile and love deeply, even after her
language stopped making much sense. Nana died in 1998. I remember my Mom getting a call
that Nana had had a grand mal seizure. In my young mind, I imagined a hurricane sweeping
through the inside of her body. She died the next day.
My Mom was a daddy’s girl - her father was her hero, and his death from cancer in 1983
was devastating to her, especially because he died 6 months after she gave birth to her first child,
my older brother. On his death bed, my Mom promised her father that she would take care of his
wife. My Mom upheld that promise, but taking care of Nana was hard. I think it was a
combination of the particular ambiguous grief of losing someone to Alzheimer’s, and that my
Mom was expected to (and expected herself to) do it all–glass ceiling-shattering career and all
the reproductive labor of taking care of a family and a home. Those years were overwhelming to
my Mom.
Underlying all the exhaustion, I think my Mom felt fear. On a gut level, my Mom feared
the possible future of getting Alzheimer’s herself. Looking at her mother was like looking at her
own worst fears of what could happen to her. The fear was visceral. She never expressed it in a
vulnerable or confessional way to me, but she told us hundreds of times over the years: “if I ever
get Alzheimer’s, take me on a long walk off a short dock.” She did not want to die that way
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herself. She practically made us promise her that we would take her to a dock and throw her in if
we had to. Although she would say it somewhat tongue-in-cheek, it was never entirely a joke.
Sometimes difficult truths can only be joked about.
I wish I knew what in particular made her say that. Was it her fear of not recognizing us?
Of being dependent on others? Of requiring lots of time and money for care? Of not being a
“productive member of society”? Of losing her identity as a woman in charge, both at work and
at home? Was it her grief about her Mom expressing itself in the language of fear? All of these
things combined? Something entirely different? She shared this refrain enough that when my
Mom finally was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease herself, it loomed in the back of all our
minds.
How it loomed in my mind was amplified by the context of my own life at the time when
my Mom was diagnosed. I was working as an end-of-life doula for two years, assisting a man
named Mark, who had ALS, with all aspects of his dying process. I was intimate with death in
those years. On April 20, 2015, Mark ended his life using physician assisted dying. I sat with
him and his wife that day, as he administered a lethal dose of medication through his feeding
tube. It was profoundly sad, as any death of a loved one is. But his death was marked with his
autonomy, and I believe that it was an empowering decision for him to make in the face of the
loss of control of every muscle in his body, including his diaphragm. He would have died before
too much longer, in a much more terrifying way, most likely by choking, as swallowing even his
own spit became nearly impossible.
In what I can only describe as an experience of the Universe laughing mirthfully, within
30 minutes of Mark dying, while I was beginning to make calls to his loved ones to let them
know about his passing, I received a call from my Mom, frantic. She had been admitted to an
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inpatient geriatric psychiatric ward. In the months leading up to Mark’s death, my Mom began to
experience a phenomenon known as Capgras Syndrome. It is a relatively rare phenomenon in
which a person believes that those they are closest to are imposters. It happens most often in
people with neurocognitive disorders or traumatic brain injuries. She had been experiencing this
with my Dad; she thought that someone who looked like my Dad had assumed his identity and
was lying about who he really was. My Mom was terrified about this, naturally, and she tried to
defend herself, sometimes by hitting him. Although my Dad was stronger than my Mom, the
situation was unsafe for both of them, and eventually after a particularly intense day of this, my
Dad called 911. The paramedics took her to a psychiatric hospital. It just happened to be the
same day, the same hour, that Mark died. That was the day that my Mom was officially
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease.
And so my Mom’s insistence over the years that my family take her on a long walk off a
short dock if she ever got Alzheimer’s registered to me in a new light. The ethics, of course,
were different with my Mom at this point, because unlike with Mark, it was unclear whether she
would be able to fully understand the implications of physician assisted dying. Not to mention
that it is illegal in the United States for people who have any kind of dementia. But over time, it
became something that I regretted not talking with my Mom about earlier in her journey, when it
may not have been legal, but it may have been ethical for her to consider seriously for herself.
She wouldn’t have been the first person to make such a decision, facing a diagnosis of
Alzheimer’s. The fear of that emotional confrontation, and the taboo of the subject, held me back
from broaching the subject with her. I don’t know for sure, but I wouldn’t be surprised if the
same things held her back from bringing it up when she was in the early stages of the disease.
I remember reading, shortly after Mark died and my Mom was diagnosed, an article in
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the New York Times about a feminist psychologist named Sandra Bem. She had been diagnosed
with Alzheimer’s, and decided to end her life before the disease did. The article detailed how she
timed the end of her life to be in the “sweet spot” to maximize the length of her life, but to
administer the lethal medication before she lost her ability to clearly comprehend what the
implications would be (Henig, 2015). Because it was not legally sanctioned by any Death with
Dignity laws in the US, Sandy Bem’s death was considered suicide. Part of what moved me
about that article was the sense of joy and agency that Sandy seemed to possess about her
decision. The conversation was out in the open.
Late into my Mom’s disease, my Dad and I confided in one another about the moral
quandary we felt about this. We both knew that she never wanted to live this way. She told us
again, and again, and again before she ever got sick. This question didn’t just animate the
hypothetical of physician assisted dying, which we both knew was out of the question due to her
inability by then to participate in informed consent. Rather, it showed up in increasingly subtle
ways as we made choices about prolonging her life. Should she continue taking medication
intended to slow the progression of Alzheimer’s, knowing that it might add 6 more months to her
life? Would those 6 months be a gift or a burden to her at this point?
When we try to honestly represent her wishes, do we remember her wishes from before
she had Alzheimer’s? Or do we try to understand what those wishes might be in the present?
And if we try to understand what those wishes might be now, how do we do that? By the time
my Dad, brother and I started to talk about this openly, my Mom struggled to participate in
conversations at all. We could not ask her directly by then. All we could do was try to assess the
quality of her life, balancing her past wishes with our sense of her experience in the present.
By then, she took pleasure in simple things; petting the dog, sitting on the couch with us,
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coloring in her coloring book. Every night, my Dad and her would sit on their patio with a glass
of wine (in my Mom’s cup, dealcoholized wine, as alcohol made her disoriented and agitated)
and watch the sunset. There was joy in her life, moments of pleasure, and moments of
connection. Was it joy she would choose for herself?
Physician Assisted Dying
This story about my Mom demanding that we take her on a long walk off a short dock
elicits multiple theoretical threads worthy of inquiry. Of course, the issue of Physician Assisted
Dying (PAD) is the subject of an ethical and cultural battleground in the United States and in
many places around the world. In the US, there are 8 states plus the District of Columbia where
PAD is legal as of 2020, however all of those places exclude people with Alzheimer’s disease
and other dementias from using this kind of care. Under the structure of current laws, the simple
reason for this is that a doctor must determine that a person has less than 6 months to live in
order for them to prescribe life-ending medication, and by the time a person with Alzheimer’s is
likely to be within 6 months of their death, they would no longer be able to provide consent due
to the cognitive declines typical of the disease in the late stages. For people with Alzheimer’s
disease, there is fundamentally an issue of timing when it comes to being excluded from legal
access to PAD. How did PAD come to have the timeline around 6 months before a natural death?
And how did PAD come to be a phenomenon to begin with? Cheryl Mwaria wrote that culture
plays a significant role in physician assisted dying, and that “focusing as it does on the
individual, our current approach to death seems to presume culture is irrelevant. Nothing,
however, couple be further from the truth” (Mwaria, 1997, p. 862). What I aim to unpack here is
an exploration of the cultural situatedness of PAD, in order to locate the reasons why people with
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Alzheimer’s are excluded from it.
Physician-Assisted Dying is a Cultural Artifact
Michael Cole described that the first basic principle of cultural-historical psychology is
that people mediate their interactions with the world and one another through artifacts (Cole,
1996, p. 108). The definition of “artifact” should be taken broadly, to include material,
ideological, and other types of things like language. Importantly, artifacts are not only tools that
do something to the world, they also do something to the user of the artifact: “every human being
has her or his subjectivity and mental life altered through the process of seizing meanings and
resources from some sociocultural environment and using them” (Shweder, 1990, p. 2).
Conceptualizing PAD as a cultural artifact situates it into a cultural-historical framework of
meaning, where it “accomplishes” more than simply the death of a person.
To begin to see PAD as a cultural artifact, it is helpful to distinguish it from other forms
of death, including other forms of suicide, and even from suicides of someone experiencing a
terminal illness or extreme old age who uses another method, such as refusing treatment or
electing to stop eating food or drinking water. PAD describes something very specific, and the
Death with Dignity organization, which has advocated for the legalization of PAD in states
around the United States, describes eligibility to use PAD as such:
To qualify under Death with Dignity statutes, you must be an adult resident of a
state where such a law is in effect; mentally competent, i.e. capable of making and
communicating your healthcare decisions; and diagnosed with a terminal illness
that will lead to death within six months, as confirmed by two physicians. The
process entails two oral requests, one written request, waiting periods, and other
requirements. (Death With Dignity, n.d.)
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If a person fits all of those eligibility requirements, they will be prescribed a lethal dose of
medication, though what exactly is prescribed varies by medical provider.
The language used to describe PAD is extremely specific, and controversial, and adds a
layer to how the literal use of PAD gets taken up in our cultural imagination. Death with Dignity,
an advocacy organization working to legalize PAD in more states in the US, notes on its website
that they prefer to call PAD “death with dignity,” but that other acceptable terms include
“physician-assisted death, physician-assisted dying, physician-hastened death/dying, aid in
dying, physician aid in dying, and medical aid in dying” (Death With Dignity, n.d.). They carry
on, noting that “Incorrect and inaccurate terms that opponents of physician-assisted dying use in
order to mislead the public include: ‘assisted suicide,’ ‘doctor-assisted suicide,’ ‘physicianassisted suicide’, and (active) ‘euthanasia’” (Death With Dignity, n.d.). It is worth noting that
while physician-assisted suicide is merely a different name for the same thing as PAD,
euthanasia is actually a slightly different act with important connotations. The European
Association of Palliative Care defines euthanasia as what happens when “a doctor intentionally
kills a person by the administration of drugs,” while PAD is when “a doctor helps a person to
commit suicide by providing drugs for self-administration” (Materstvedt et al., 2003). The
terminology with which we describe PAD impacts how we understand the act, and the
connotation with or distancing from “suicide” is key in understanding what role(s) PAD plays on
a cultural level. This brings up questions of the culturally specific meanings and connotations
with the term “suicide,” which both sides of the debate use as a negative, taboo term. PAD does
not attempt to undo the taboo of suicide; rather, it attempts to distinguish itself from suicide such
that it avoids carrying the same associations of shame, despair, and tragedy.
Rather, PAD is framed as hastening death for somebody for whom it is already immanent
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and inevitable, with the intention to reduce suffering associated with many end-stage terminal
illnesses. The right to die is one of the most compelling arguments for the expanded legalization
of PAD, as “it draws on the principle of autonomy, which is highly valued in a democracy”
(Tomlinson, Spector, Nurock, & Stott, 2015, p. 724). The reduction of suffering is focused
primarily upon physical suffering, as many states in the US require an evaluation by a
psychologist to rule out psychological drivers behind the wish to end one’s life with PAD, and
the presence of depressive and certain other psychological disorders can disqualify potential
candidates of PAD. This distinction between physiological and psychological drivers of the wish
to end one’s life is a particularly fraught element of the cultural debates over the legality of PAD,
as some have argued for the legality of PAD for psychiatric illnesses including treatmentresistant depression, which is legal (although rarely approved) in the Netherlands and Belgium
(Steinbock, 2017). The Netherlands is also the only country in which PAD is a legal option for
people with Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias (D. Jones, Gastmans, & MacKellar, 2017).
Alzheimer’s disease is in an odd middle ground with regards to the split between physiological
and psychological disorders driving the decision to end one’s life before the disease does. Unlike
psychiatric illnesses, Alzheimer’s disease is a terminal illness that has a clear biological etiology;
however, its primary symptoms are in the domains most often claimed by psychology: cognition,
behavior, and social relationships.
Ecological Developmental Model of PAD
Urie Bronfenbrenner originally published The Ecology of Human Development in 1981,
which has since been widely influential, including being significantly taken up in the 2017 APA
multicultural guidelines (American Psychological Association, 2017). His dynamic, bidirectional
ecological model of human development suggested that we seriously analyze how the context of
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human experience is left out of most accounts of developmental psychology (especially coming
from a Piagetian model), and that furthermore, context is complex and dynamic, and should be
conceptually broken down into several interacting levels to better see its nuance. Bronfenbrenner
wrote, “The ecological environment is conceived as extending far beyond the immediate
situation directly affecting the developing person” (1981, p. 7), giving a wider lens of analysis
for understanding individual experience. His model includes several levels that are like
concentric rings around the individual, that extend from internal experience of an individual
through many layers of relational contexts from immediate family to community, institutions,
sociopolitical systems, cultural ideologies, and global environments.
This ecological model of development allows us to see a more dynamic picture of how
PAD may be taken up in an individual’s life. As Susan Wolf put it in her feminist analysis of the
issue, “the debate over whether to legitimate physician-assisted suicide is most often about a
patient who does not exist – a patient with no gender, race, or insurance status” (1996, p. 282).
By using an ecological approach to understanding context and identity, we can better understand
how PAD might impact real people situated in their specific sociocultural context. Furthermore,
we can get a better understanding of the ways in which PAD does not exist merely as an
individual choice, but impacts the individual through multiple contextual layers. Cheryl Mwaria
(1997) urged people to consider the impact of culture on the debate about expanding legal access
to physician assisted suicide. She argued that in considering physician-assisted suicide, “the real
challenge lies in understanding the nature of culture itself. By definition, culture is learned
behavior pertaining to norms for what is considered proper, moral or even sane; as well as
values, customs, beliefs and artifacts that comprise the knowledge and technology by which we
adapt, or fail to adapt, to the physical environment” (1997, p. 859). She called attention to the
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sometimes unconscious impact of broader contextual factors on an individual’s choice to end
their life with PAD. She cautioned, “What seems on the surface to be a voluntary act, the rational
decision to end one's life, may actually be the product of social expectations” (p. 862).
Considering social power dynamics, systems of medical care, governmental structures
that impact caregiving and access to care such as Medicaid and managed care, the “right to die”
argument becomes more complicated, and it becomes complicated in unique ways for people
with Alzheimer’s disease. An international systemic review of the literature on attitudes toward
PAD for people with dementia found that “sociodemographic factors influence attitudes toward
assisted dying,” including factors like age, ethnicity, gender and religion (Tomlinson & Stott,
2015, p. 10). Arguments about the impact of culture and other layers of the ecological model of
development help us pay attention to things like how gender roles might impact the level of
comfort a person might feel in depending on others for care. This example remains relevant for
people with Alzheimer’s disease, however there are additional and unique layers to consider with
regards to PAD being used by people with Alzheimer’s and other dementias.
Arguments that this dissertation has already reviewed about the debate on selfhood in
people with Alzheimer’s disease are particularly relevant. Although I argued in the literature
review section of this dissertation that people with Alzheimer’s disease have an ongoing
embodied selfhood, there is no doubt that there are major changes in the self that occur over the
course of the disease. Indeed, that there is a debate about whether or not the self persists
throughout the course of the disease is an important cultural factor in considering the
unconscious ways in which people with Alzheimer’s disease may be influenced in deciding
whether or not to use PAD were it legal. The fact that Alzheimer’s disease itself is often
stigmatized and people with the disease are often devalued in our hypercognitive culture could
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potentially influence a person to feel that they would avoid profound suffering if they could die
before the disease runs its full course. In other words, part of the suffering experienced by people
with Alzheimer’s disease includes being socially devalued, which can be understood as “excess
disability,” a concept I discussed in the literature review of this dissertation, which articulates the
“discrepancy that exists when a person’s functional incapacity is greater than that warranted by
the actual impairment” (Brody et al., 1971, p. 124). Insofar as this aspect of suffering might
influence a person with Alzheimer’s disease to want to use PAD, a more ethical intervention than
PAD would be an intervention on a cultural level to reduce stigma and increase a value of
neurodiverse people, including people with Alzheimer’s disease. Of course, this is not the only
element of suffering that people with Alzheimer’s disease experience, however it is an important
cultural consideration of the use of PAD with people who have Alzheimer’s.
The same systemic review mentioned above found that issues of capacity and dementia
severity are important considerations, and that people with dementia and their caregivers “held
reservations about euthanasia in advanced dementia and were instead supportive of PAS
[Physician-Assisted Suicide] in the early stages of dementia” (Tomlinson & Stott, 2015, p. 17).
Being able to participate in informed consent can become impossible in the late stages of the
disease despite the presence of a persistent embodied selfhood in people with Alzheimer’s
disease. It comes down, once again, to the issue of timing: while people in the early stages of
Alzheimer’s can participate in informed consent, at that point they are too far from death to be
eligible to legally use PAD. However, even people in the early stages of the disease are
vulnerable to social pressures that can influence one’s autonomy in consenting to PAD. The
negative stigma of simply having Alzheimer’s disease is likely to exert a degree of pressure that
can be difficult to mediate.
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This raises questions about how we structure legal access to PAD. Why is it that 6
months is the legal window within which one can use PAD in the US? Might people with
Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias deserve to have access to PAD earlier should they wish
to use it? The intent of this chapter is not to advocate one way or the other for expanding legal
access to PAD to people with Alzheimer’s disease, but rather to explore the complexity of the
issue and situate the debate within broader cultural considerations. Personally, I feel uncertain
about my stance on this issue even after further research. While it was clear that my Mom wished
in her earlier years to die before she had advanced Alzheimer’s disease, this dissertation
demonstrates the value and gifts that she offered to the world even while she was in the advanced
stages of the disease. And by the time she was later into the disease, it did not at all seem clear
that she would have rather not been alive for her final years. My Mom’s experience, however, is
not indicative or prescriptive of the experience of others living with Alzheimer’s disease or other
dementias, and is highly influenced by her specific cultural situatedness as a white woman who
thrived in our hypercognitive culture, who identified as a caregiver through her roles as a mother
and daughter, and who witnessed her own mother’s decline and eventual death from Alzheimer’s
disease within our system of managed medical care.
What is clear through this exploration is that the medical industrial complex, interwoven
as it is with our legal system, highly regulates who can access what type of care, when they can
access it, and what counts as qualifying for access, often without consideration for cultural
situatedness and the implicit pressure people may experience based on their socialization within
certain culturally delineated roles such as gender, race, or disability status. Although this chapter
focuses specifically on the legal and medical structures in the United States, there are insights
relatable to dying in the Anthropocene, in particular regarding the meanings attached to death
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that motivate arguments on either side of the debate about PAD. That the medical industrial
complex has such a degree of influence and power over our choices about living and dying is
itself a symptom of the Anthropocene. Whether it is good or bad, something people should have
control to hasten or delay, when and how it is better to seek death than to seek ongoing life, and
how to navigate issues of consent and representation for beings who cannot advocate for
themselves within our current social structures are all relevant debates, and the answers are
complex and perhaps can never be settled entirely. Expanding these debates onto the level of the
human species and our interdependence with an animate biosphere, is relevant to this moment of
existential crisis in the Anthropocene. Roy Scranton wrote, “it may be that we have crossed the
summit of our knowledge and power, and the brief explosion of human life in the Holocene will
turn out to have been as transient as an algae bloom. It may be, on the other hand, that we’ll find
a way to survive in the Anthropocene, perhaps even find ways to maintain human civilization in
some recognizable form” (Scranton, 2015, p. 118). As we make choices about whether and how
we collectively live and die in the Anthropocene, we must represent the other-than-human beings
who cannot self-advocate within our social structures. Navigating the complex ethics of these
choices is not straightforward at all.
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Chapter 7: Time Traveling
When my Mom stopped eating for 4 days in February 2019, the owner of the assisted
living facility into which we had moved her only a month prior suggested it was time to get
hospice services for her. Although she had been engaged in profound transformation for years
already, I was not ready for this suggestion, and suddenly I was forced to consider just how
immanent her death could be.
I did not want my Mom to die! I felt confused, devastated, and scared. And then a wave
washed over me: awe. She is twisting the folds of the skin between this world and the spirit
world. Twisting it toward an opening for her passage. It felt so much like a birth - something
within her set in motion this process, and everything in her lifeworld was contracting, making
space, allowing, saying “yes,” breathing with and for her. A movement that was bigger-than was
casting us all to our knees, rhythmically sighing, crying, breathing with and for her. Moving her
spirit through us. Letting go where we could, though parts of us rebelled and pleaded for more
time. Parts of us remembered the softness of her skin and wonder whether they’ll ever touch
anything so soft again. A softness our hearts could touch. A softness we shepherd through the
movement.
My Mom died on April 20, 2019. My Dad was with her, holding her hand, and I was at
home in Pittsburgh, my brother at his home in Portland, OR. There was something that felt
removed from time when she died. That night, it felt so unreal to learn of her death in my
bedroom around midnight, as if news like that should only be delivered in special places away
from everyday life. My grief about my Mom had been with me for years already, a blend of
anticipatory grief and an ongoing series of losses with the transformation of our relationship as
her disease progressed. I had tried to tame my grief over those years to have some semblance of
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normal life, although the journey to this point had been very difficult already. In recent years, my
grief had been coming out sideways; often when I felt unrestrained joy, I would begin crying, the
grief having found an escape hatch. I tried to let myself grieve in intentional doses, but I had a
filter. I felt I needed a filter to carry on with my own life over those years, like a dam that
regulated the flow of a river.
When she died, the dam broke.
For weeks after her death, I was inundated with vivid memories of being with her
throughout my lifetime. I did not try to remember these things; rather, I felt as if I were simply a
conduit, and my grief had its own intentionality, flowing through me with force. I found myself
in my parent’s bed again as a young child, giggling together with my Mom as we cuddled on a
weekend morning, the sheets illuminated by sunlight streaming through the window, the smell of
waffles and bacon drifting up from the kitchen downstairs where my dad cooked breakfast, still
in his fleece bathrobe. Joy. I found myself storming up the stairs in high school away from a
fight with my Mom, and after a few minutes, her following me to make peace about whatever it
was we were fighting about. These and hundreds, maybe thousands of other memories were
more vivid than anything happening around me, flowing from one to the next. My grief made the
world I was actually in feel colorless, and my body felt like it weighed a thousand pounds in
those weeks. But in the flood of memories there was life and levity, and I time travelled from
memory to memory, an orangutan in the jungle of my Mom, my world-maker. A whole
ecosystem of memories to dwell in.
My Mom had taught me during her time with Alzheimer’s about time travel. At first, I
found it scary, being shuttled with her into her memories of her parents, who she often thought
were still alive. One minute we would be talking about her childhood as if she were still in high
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school, needing to prepare for an exam, and the next we would be in her adulthood when she was
caregiving for her own mother, who had died some 20 years prior. Being in conversation with
her meant you had to be ready to time travel at any moment. It required a receptiveness beyond
the frame of my own perception and flexibility in one of our most basic forms of being oriented
to the world: knowing where you are in time and space.
At first, I felt rigid and resistant to time traveling with her. I remember having a dream
about it in 2017. My journal from the time wrote: “I dreamt I went through the portal, down
through some kind of webbing, below. Landing in Disneyland after dark, but not the way it is
marketed. It is disorienting like a state fair after too many rollercoaster rides, clownish music
distorting, childhood imagery suddenly frightening. I’m with my Mom, and I’m searching for her
at the same time.” It was so disorienting to time travel with my Mom; to meet her where she was
at, wherever and whenever she was at from her point of view. I felt as if I might lose my own
grip on the present, and on my sanity, in the process of trying to join with her.
Over time I became more comfortable time traveling with her. I’m not sure if I got used
to it, or if it just started to feel less scary. Wrapped up into the time traveling was an engagement
with my grief: my sadness, anger, confusion, and simple resistance to the fact that my Mom had
Alzheimer’s. To join with her was to allow all those things into my experience. To be present
with her required being present with my grief. Time traveling with my Mom meant that things
were not how they used to be between us.
I don’t remember how many days passed between when my Mom died and when I flew
to Tucson with my partner Kyle to be with my family. I do remember feeling completely useless
though. My friend Autumn Marie came over to help me pack my suitcase. Kyle sat in the middle
seat on the plane while I sat at the window, him guarding me from having to interact with any
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other people, receiving the in-flight snacks for me. I remember thinking about all the other
bereaved people who fly every day after receiving shocking news of a loved one’s death. I felt a
solidarity with this fragile, invisible community.
Within a week following my Mom’s death, my family had a viewing so we could say
goodbye to her body before she was cremated. We planned for a larger celebration of life a
couple months later, so the viewing was just my Dad, my brother, my brother’s partner Lisa,
Kyle, and my Mom’s cousin David. Saying goodbye to my Mom… there was an impossibility of
that day. My Mom, the creator of my lifeworld. I can’t describe that experience with many
words, nor do I want to let my readers into the full depth of that memory; it is mine to keep.
However, at her viewing I cried with a wide open heart, no holding back. My Mom’s cousin
David commented that it was as if each gasping breath I took as I sobbed was as if I were
breathing in another memory, each breath out, giving another memory to her. My Mom taught
me how to time travel when she had Alzheimer’s, which ended up helping me survive her death.
I trusted that I could give myself over to that journey through time with the surge of memories
flowing through me.
Grief: Ontological Liminality
Grief is a cellular matter. […] One lives a kind of cocoon existence: the world
fades and the body shrinks into the space of its grieving.
– Robert Romanyshyn, 2002, p.55
Grief animates this project, which I began before my Mom died. In a way, this project is
an anatomy of grief. A map of my grief for me to find myself in, because I spent so much time
lost. Lost in the fog of confusion, right there with my Mom. The mother I knew was changing,
becoming unrecognizable in some ways, long before her death. As I became a secondary
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caregiver for my Mom, I grieved the parent-child relationship I was used to. I was privileged to
grow up with a Mom I could rely on to take care of me. As her disease progressed, I lost the
mom who could take care of me and gained a mom who I could take care of.
What is the grieving process like when losing someone to Alzheimer’s? Although
depression and stress in caregivers of people with Alzheimer’s has been widely researched
(Schulz et al., 2003), caregiver grief has gained relatively little focus (Large & Slinger, 2015). It
has been suggested that caregiver grief has often been misdiagnosed as depression, especially the
phenomenon of anticipatory grief (Walker & Pomeroy, 1996). Grief is a relational phenomenon.
What is unique about grief associated with losing someone from Alzheimer’s?
Anticipatory grief is a kind of grief that is experienced when anticipating losses. It is
typically an experience that motivates discussions about dying and addressing any problems in
interpersonal relationships with the person dying (Rando, 2000). When losing somebody to
Alzheimer’s, anticipatory grief is the anticipation of further decline and eventual death. Unlike
with many other forms of illness, anticipatory grief in this context often occurs simultaneously
with another form of grief: ambiguous loss.
Ambiguous loss refers to experiencing ambiguity of absence and presence, and is a
defining experience among people who love somebody with Alzheimer’s disease where the
person is physically present but experiences profound psychosocial changes (Boss, 2009).
Pauline Boss (2009) wrote, “Ambiguous loss is the most stressful loss people can face” (Boss,
2009, p. 20). Marwit and Meuser (2005) argued that the grief of caregivers of individuals with
dementia is ‘‘more akin to true grief [post-death grief] than it is to the anticipatory grief
experienced by caregivers of patients with other terminal illness’’ (p. 202). Ambiguous loss can
cause people to feel bewildered and immobilized, as the uncertainty makes it difficult to adjust,
96

for example by reorganizing roles in the family system. Blandin and Pepin (2017) expanded on
this by acknowledging the compounded serial losses with the progression of the disease.
Furthermore, Boss articulated that “people are denied symbolic rituals that ordinarily support a
clear loss” (2009, p. 7), resulting in an isolated and unvalidated experience for many people
going through an ambiguous loss. Finally, because ambiguous losses typically last for an
indefinite, ongoing period of time, it causes emotional exhaustion from the relentless uncertainty
(Boss, 2009, pp. 7-8).
The experience of ambiguous loss has gained more focus in the literature than post-death
grief in loved ones of somebody with Alzheimer’s disease due to its unique and defining nature.
Caregivers experience a magnitude of stress preceding physical death considered equal to or
greater than the stress in bereavement after physical death (Noyes et al., 2010). Ambiguous loss
creates significant distress before the death of the loved one with Alzheimer’s, and because it is
largely unrecognized and even stigmatized, it warrants the attention it has gotten in research. I
aim to describe here a more in-depth account of the lived experience of ambiguous loss and the
effect it has on post-death grief when losing a loved one to Alzheimer’s.
Liminality
Blandin and Pepin (2017) offer the concept of liminality to describe the experience of
pre-death grief of a loved one with Alzheimer’s:
Liminality is the state of being in-between a previous situation and an emerging situation.
Liminal is derived from the Latin word limen, which means threshold. In crossing a
threshold, there is movement from one place or state to another; when one stands in the
threshold, however, one is betwixt and between both. (p. 73)
Liminality, or being-between-worlds, is a fruitful concept in delivering a more
97

phenomenological understanding of ambiguous grief.
This description resonates with my experience of grief before my Mom died. It felt as if
the level of stress and grief I felt while my Mom was living with Alzheimer’s had no place to go
or be recognized. While life outside my family carried on with its usual high-speed clip, for the
majority of the time my Mom had Alzheimer’s she thought of me as still being a college student.
I was in multiple timescapes simultaneously. Although I was young when she was sick – in my
late 20s – I felt trapped in her perception as being in an earlier developmental stage, further
complicating my family’s ability to reorganize our roles. My social experience of time was either
stuck too far in the past or moving too quickly toward the future to make room for the slowmoving elephant that was my grief. I was time-travelling every day, held between my grief and
my obligations to my PhD program as a psychologist in training.
Liminality in the grief of loving someone with Alzheimer’s touches identity, time, and
community, and is a crucial concept in understanding what I experienced as a form of time
traveling. Blandin and Pepin offer the concept of liminality to describe the ambiguous pre-death
grief, because of the ongoing losses paired with ongoing presence of the person with
Alzheimer’s. However, I wish to expand this description of liminality beyond the feelings
provoked by the ambiguous presence and absence of the person with Alzheimer’s, or the
ambiguous presence and absence after the death of someone with Alzheimer’s. Liminality
describes an ontological experience in this grief. Existential phenomenology can help form a
deeper description of this.
From an existential phenomenological perspective, human existence cannot be separated
from the world in which we dwell. “Dasein” is a term that the philosopher Martin Heidegger
coined, which literally means “there-being,” and is often understood as “presence” or as
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“existence” (Heidegger, 1962). The importance of this term is that it refuses to disentangle being
from its context, and captures the fact that people are permeable with their environment,
histories, and relationships as “being-in-the-world.” Erik Craig describes being-in-the-world
eloquently: “I don’t experience my existence as stopping here with my flesh but, rather, as
extending outward, and outward, and outward, in space, time, and relation” (2008, p. 242).
Being-in-the-world is a term that is hyphenated because it indicates the utterly inseparable nature
of Being from the context within which one exists. In other words, not only do we not exist in a
vacuum, we could not exist in a vacuum. Rather, we exist because of, and out in, the world.
Erik Craig provides a beautiful example of what this term can contribute to our
understanding of grief:
If we do exist, fundamentally, as in-the-world, as-world, then others, especially
significant others, actually comprise our existence, to a mighty degree are our
existence. […] When a person loses a parent, or child, or partner, or dear friend to
death, it is a significant feature of that individual’s very own existence and
identity within it that dies. (2008, p. 247)
Our in-the-world nature means that we inhabit shared lifeworlds with the people and
other beings and places with whom we are in relation. When somebody who sculpts part of our
lifeworld dies, our lifeworld itself is altered. The part of our lifeworld we shared with that other
closes off. “This expansion and mutual overlap of selves may be regarded as the most essential
presupposition of grief. For it means that the other is present for me both as other, as the real
person, and as the “other-of-myself,” as part of my self-experience” (Fuchs, 2018, p. 49). Being
in relationship entails an overlapping, a joining of lifeworlds. Our relational nature is not simply
that we deeply love others and suffer when we lose them, but that we are, in fact, partially
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constituted by others. This implies a deep relationality—an intercorporeality—a permeability
with other beings. We are permeable not only to other beings, but also to places, things, cultures,
and histories. Our skin is a permeable threshold, our being emanates beyond the periphery of the
skin, and the world lives as much outside us as it does inside us.
Being-with others is something that takes place in time, and it is worth here exploring the
role of temporality in grief. Intercorporeality with loved ones that I mentioned above also implies
a “contemporality” with others: “from early childhood on, intersubjective synchronicity is
constituted through the presence of others and through our shared reference to the world, as in
joint attention or joint action” (Fuchs, 2018, p. 50). Pre-reflexive understanding of one’s location
in time, or lived time, is in part constituted by being in relation to other beings in time. This is
what Minkowski (1970, p. 65) refers to as “lived synchronism,” that is, a kind of vital contact
with or harmonious immersion in the flow of the world around us. Loved ones constitute a large
portion of our sense of being-in-the-world. This anchoring into contemporality with other beings
begins in infancy, with the attunement between baby and caregiver through responsive touch,
gaze, facial expressions and tone of voice (Wallin, 2007, p. 293). Anchoring into relationship
with caregivers is also a way of anchoring into a rhythmic time that expands beyond the simple
internal rhythms of breath and heartbeat.
Relationships with caregivers expand the horizon of lived time. The experience of time is
deeply influenced by the relationship one has with one’s earliest attachment figures. Fuchs
wrote, “present time, or the’ now’, always means the actual, imagined or at least implicit
presence of others with whom we, in principle at least, co-experience the world” (2018, p. 50).
This endures throughout the lifespan, though perhaps in a decreasingly conscious manner. When
primary attachment relationships end due to the death of the caregiver, a temporal chasm
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emerges. One’s immersion in the flow of time that is established in part through the presence,
real and imagined, of the primary attachment figure meets a fork in the road: time, of course,
continues flowing, but the horizon of the lifeworld extended by the primary attachment figure
stops in its tracks. Fuchs continued: “The temporality of grief may be described as a separation
of two forms of time, one flowing, one arrested, which become more and more desynchronized”
(2018, p. 50).
Already a sort of time traveling happens inadvertently, between the ongoing flow of the
present and this arrested past in which the loved one was still alive. It is not uncommon for
people to describe early grief as if they are barely present in the ongoing flow of time; their
bodies feel heavy, their thoughts sluggish and unable to make simple decisions. Their awareness
and attunement are mostly elsewhere in time, in the past with their loved one. This kind of time
travel is not graceful.
Although I, too, experienced this sluggishness, I believe my contemporality with a loved
one who had Alzheimer’s disease taught me how to time travel before my Mom’s death. There
were two major ways in which my Mom taught me to be comfortable with time travel before
being thrown into the time travel inherent in grief. One, of course, was the time travel involved
in attuning to and joining with her lifeworld, which involved significant and sometimes rapid
time travel between different periods of time in her own life. Second was the flip-side of the
same coin: the intermittent departure from the flow of my situatedness in the broader
sociocultural here and now. Being-with her meant being-away from my immediate surrounds,
disengaging from my own ground. My Mom taught me about liminality while she was alive,
which made the liminal nature of grieving her death easier to navigate, almost literally. I did not
resist being thrust into the liminal when she died because I felt oriented to the liminal already.
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Mariana Ortega, a Latina feminist phenomenologist, wrote that “Heidegger discusses the
importance of Dasein being a historical being that interprets itself in specific environments, but
he does not describe or engage with those environments” (2016, p. 56). Ortega’s important
contribution to phenomenology focuses on sociocultural situatedness, and her attention to the
specificity of the “world” of being-in-the-world is helpful in understanding the liminality I
became oriented within while my Mom had Alzheimer’s. Ortega describes the being in a
multiplicity of particular histories, using the example of Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La
Frontera(1999), in which Anzaldúa describes the international borderlands between the U.S. and
Mexico. Ortega documents the multiplicities and in-betweenness of living under multiple
conflicting sociopolitical histories simultaneously. Ortega proposes an “in-between,
multiplicitous selfhood,” which has a condition of “liminality” and involves inhabiting “more
than one world” and travelling constantly across worlds (2016, pp. 64-65). Ortega offers an
understanding that the self is transformed by being in more than one world, and that liminality is
not just a condition out there in the world, but one that becomes fundamental to the experience of
being.
Ortega (2016) wrote that Latina feminist phenomenology underscores the ontic—the
material conditions of being human—focusing especially on the “particular power relations
informing specific economic, cultural, and societal ‘theres’” (p. 53). Those particular powerladen “theres” into which we are thrown (the ‘da’ of dasein) are complex, and impact things like
mood, language, how we move through space, how we conceive of and experience time, and
other existentalia. She articulates this as an integration of the ontic and the ontological – being
liminal is an ontological trait, but it appears because of the world-traveling of belonging in
multiple worlds. Ortega’s integration of the ontic and the ontological is important to this
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discussion of liminality in the grief of losing a loved one to Alzheimer’s. It also offers an
understanding where the material conditions of the Anthropocene influence the ontological
conditions of being-in-the-world.
The fact that Western societies tend to conceive of time as linear and bereavement as a
minor interruption in productivity creates resistance to the multiplicitous experience of time, one
that is internalized by people acculturated in these ideas. Of course, there are power dynamics
behind this which animate subjectivity during the Anthropocene: a linear understanding of time
is important to the economic system of capitalism, and limiting the time and space in which grief
can be experienced keeps the engines of capital churning and diminishes resistance to the
economic powers that spread unprecedented destruction through the natural world. Much like I
tell my clients who experience depression that psychic numbing is a blunt instrument, one that
tends to numb not only pain but also joy, something similar can be said of grief. Having time and
space to fall apart in grief, to time travel in grief, puts the many ungrieved griefs of the past into
reach. When you really let yourself go into the river of grief, the losses of our contemporary
world shaped in the Anthropocene can come into sharp relief as well. Becoming oriented in the
liminality of chronic grief is an important skill for being and dying in the Anthropocene, one
which our most forgetful elders are skilled in helping us learn.
Liminality therefore is not simply a metaphor to describe the ambiguous presence and
absence of a dying loved one. Liminality is an ontological experience of the griever, one that
stretches being-in-time such that one experiences not simply being in the present or the past, but
being in the present and the past simultaneously; it is a multiplicitous selfhood. Simms explains:
“From the beginning, perception is never neutral but shot through with memory and desire:
memory of past perceptions and desire for connecting the present with the past” (2008, pp. 34,
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italics in the original). When loving somebody with Alzheimer’s, the time travel required to join
with the person in their present understanding of reality builds a certain skill, fortitude, and even
mastery, like learning to ride a bike, in being in multiple worlds.
It is not uncommon to hear of people feeling relieved when a loved one dies from
Alzheimer’s (Doka, 2004), because the painful ambiguous grief that can last for years, and
finally that ambiguous grief becomes—well, not ambiguous anymore. In my own experience, I
would describe this differently. Compared with other deaths I have experienced, I felt well
prepared to be in the liminality of grief, and so there was an ease in the grief after my Mom died.
Not to mention, there was a shift in the social recognition and support I gained in the immediate
aftermath of my Mom’s death, which allowed me to further let go into my grief without trying to
stay grounded in the here-and-now. Navigating the torrent of memories surging through me in
the weeks after my Mom died felt like something I was already skilled in doing, which meant I
did not need to resist the powerfully disorienting process of my own time travel. I could just let
the memories come; I could trust that journey. Indeed, I could take refuge in my memories of my
Mom; I let myself feel the reality of those memories not as a past which was irrevocably severed
from the present, but as a place I visited through time travel that was just as real as anything else.
I didn’t look at the memories from the outside, but rather entered into them fully. This was the
gift my Mom gave me, what she taught me in her own time travel while she had Alzheimer’s.
Losing her made me want her comfort more than anyone else’s, and I was able to really receive
that comfort by entering into my memories of her as the here and now.
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Chapter 8: Discussion
Through autoethnographic, phenomenological and critical theoretical methods, this
dissertation elaborated my relational connection to my Mom in the context of our cultural
situatedness. I used evocative vignettes to trace my memories of being with my Mom while she
had Alzheimer’s disease. I then analyzed each vignette to connect my experience with wider
cultural, political and historical meanings and phenomena to understand how our relational
connection was permeated by and situated within a broader context. Through each vignette and
its connected analysis, themes and implications emerged that supported the primary question of
this dissertation: what can people with Alzheimer’s disease can teach us about being, forgetting,
and dying in the Anthropocene, an era of deep, collective forgetfulness about our
interconnectedness with human and non-human beings? This chapter will briefly summarize the
findings and questions explored in this dissertation, implications of the findings, limitations of
the project, and directions for further inquiry.
Summary of Findings
The basic research prompts of this project were “what was my relationship with my Mom
like while she had Alzheimer’s disease?” and “how was our experience situated in broader
sociocultural and historical contexts?” These questions aimed to describe and elaborate on the
phenomenon in order to better understand what happened, and to share my stories of being with
my Mom as a narrative offering of the complexities and gifts of loving someone with
Alzheimer’s disease. These prompts generated the stories which became the data that I used to
address my overarching research question, “what can people with Alzheimer’s disease teach us
about being, forgetting and dying in the Anthropocene, an era of deep, collective forgetfulness
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about our interconnectedness with human and non-human beings?” This question aims to
synthesize the answers to the previous questions and offer a more generalizable take away from
my experiences. This question also intends to challenge dominant discourses around a deficit
model of understanding Alzheimer’s disease by asking what wisdom people with Alzheimer’s
disease can offer humanity in the face of our collective existential crisis related to climate
change.
I told many stories in this dissertation. I shared my pain about Alzheimer’s disease being
the elephant in the room as my Mom denied having it. I observed how objects of her lifeworld
became things again, de-objectified as her cognition changed over the course of the disease. I
shared unexpected gifts my Mom gave me, including introducing me to ancestors who I didn’t
know were there. I described a shape-shifting landscape and how my Mom would self-locate
based on her emotional stirrings and memories of belonging in other landscapes. I shared the
dilemma my family faced as my Mom’s health went downhill, and questions emerged of how
best to care for her on the spectrum between prolonging her life and using physician-assisted
dying. Finally, I shared the story of when my Mom died, and the skills she gave me in time
traveling, which became a refuge in my grief.
Each of these stories was followed by a section of critical analysis, which elicited themes
and connected my stories to broader psychological, sociocultural and philosophical phenomena
and ideas. I analyzed the role of denial in psychological and sociocultural contexts, drawing a
connection with the denial we see about the era of the Anthropocene. I explored the
phenomenology of things, and the animacy of the unobjectified world around us. I discussed coexistentiality and intersubjectivity as ontological dimensions of experience. I explored dwelling
as a fundamental aspect of existence, and the specificity of place as an anchor in identity. I
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examined physician assisted dying as an artifact of Western allopathic medicine and situated it
within an ecological-developmental context of human experience. Finally, I explored the
ontology of liminality as a defining framework for the experience of ambiguous grief in losing a
loved one to Alzheimer’s disease.
This project traveled in many directions and integrated theoretical perspectives from
multiple disciplines. Thematic threads that persisted throughout the project included the
examination of selfhood and the Western, and specifically American, cultural values that limit
our understandings of selfhood as being especially defined by cognition. I advanced stories and
arguments that see people with Alzheimer’s disease as having an ongoing selfhood that
continues to contribute important, unique, and unreplaceable perspectives to their communities.
Another core theme was an examination of how our understandings of selfhood influence what
we consider to be “care.” I advanced arguments about co-existentiality and interdependence that
expand the scope of care. Through this project, I contributed to the development of a more robust
understanding of being in relation to loved ones who have Alzheimer’s disease, to offer language
to the experiences of intersubjectivity that can deeply alter our own perception of what it means
to navigate death and life, remembering and forgetting, in a Western neoliberal cultural context.
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to explore what it was like to share a
relational world with my Mom while she lived with Alzheimer’s disease that is responsive to the
sociopolitical and historical dynamics of living in the Anthropocene, and to articulate the unique
perspectives my Mom’s forgetfulness could offer about how to live in a deeply forgetful era. I
wanted my readers to feel in their bodies the rhythms of remembering, the textures of lifeworlds
and temporal horizons shuffling. I intended for my readers to question what they have forgotten,
to feel their own lacunas of belonging, and to inch toward the portals of liminality we are invited
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to enter by our forgetful elders.
Implications
Our treatment of people with Alzheimer’s disease speaks of who and what we are,
and so the tangled veil is truly a mirror.
– Steven Sabat (2001, p. 340).
This dissertation offers findings specific to my relationship with my Mom while she had
Alzheimer’s, as well as implications that are generalizable beyond her and I. Importantly this
dissertation advanced an exploration about subjectivity that expands Western understandings of
intersubjectivity and cognition, and locates subjectivity within particular cultural contexts and
fields of embodiment that extend beyond the periphery of the skin. How our culture thinks about
and treats people with Alzheimer’s is of philosophical and political significance. It has the
potential to reveal our culture’s ontological values and how those values promote alienation from
the earth, from things, and from each other, and how people with Alzheimer’s can teach us
another way of being woven into our collective lifeworld.
The question that I aim to address in the implications section is: What can our most
forgetful elders teach us about being, forgetting and dying in the Anthropocene, an era of deep,
collective forgetfulness about our interconnectedness with human and non-human beings? By
synthesizing the previous chapters I aim in this section to attempt an answer, or at least a partial
answer, to this question. This is a question about wisdom, about the specific perspective and
knowledge that people with Alzheimer’s have. It is a question that aims not only to find some
real answers, but that by asking it is also intended to help my readers resist the pathology
paradigm, which looks at people with Alzheimer’s from a deficit perspective. I intend for this
section to offer the wisdom that arose in the space between my Mom and I during her journey
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with Alzheimer’s. Wisdom, an offering of perspective gained from experience. Although these
themes are not exhaustive, they are the ones that most resonated with me and which most
directly related to the data gathered and analyzed in previous sections of this dissertation.
Denial is part of the journey, and it needs to be worked through.
Denial is a life-saving defense mechanism that helps protect us from catastrophic anxiety.
Denial is about anticipating psychic annihilation. Climate chaos brought on by the Anthropocene
can, and probably should, trigger catastrophic anxiety; it is, after all, an existential threat. Denial
about climate chaos is commonplace. It is not just in politicians and oil tycoons, and your
difficult uncle you only see at holiday dinners. Denial is in you. Denial is in me. Denial is a
curious squirrel who keeps coming back for more, who has learned that there will continue to be
more and more scraps to forage as we uncover ever more about the crisis of the Anthropocene.
Denial is best handled with compassion, reflection, generous resonance, and loving curiosity
about the underlying anxiety. Accountability is the goal, but to create movement with denial,
attend to the affect rather than the thought content. Catastrophic anxiety is decreased when we
don’t feel alone in it. Lean into connection, offer connection, when you notice denial. It takes
tremendous courage to look at the Anthropocene, and we can’t do it alone. Getting into
connection might itself require accountability, as the same systems that have created the
Anthropocene—capitalism and colonialism—also have created systemic social injustices which
create and maintain chronic disconnection. We have our work cut out for us.
Listen for the animacy of things and other beings.
There is a lot more animacy around us than we have been trained to perceive as people
socialized in American culture, steeped as it is in economics of exchange value and
consumerism. Objectifying things makes your life easier – you reduce the friction between your
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intention and the world of things. Another way of saying friction is relation. There is again a
chronic disconnection–a species loneliness–that comes from our reliance on objectification and,
ironically, the culture we live in practically demands constant objectification in order to belong.
Robin Wall Kimmerer described species loneliness as “a deep, unnamed sadness stemming from
estrangement from the rest of Creation, from the loss of relationship. As our dominance of the
world has grown, we have become more isolated, more lonely when we can no longer call out to
our neighbors” (Kimmerer, 2013, p. 208). My Mom experienced a decline of the ability to
objectify things; examples I gave in this dissertation included her use of utensils and her way of
talking about the mountains. Although objectification is not inherently and unequivocally bad,
taking a receptive, curious stance toward things allows you to perceive the animacy in them.
When you see from your heart rather than your head, animacy is easier to perceive. Being with
the animacy of things and other beings is being connected. Feeling this connection with other
beings – human and other-than-human – is an essential starting place for developing the
motivation and political will to steer us out of climate chaos.
You can call upon your ancestors for support and guidance.
Although the medical model would look at the common experience of people with
Alzheimer’s disease feeling the presence of their deceased parents or other loved ones as a
delusion, it looks very different if you remove the lens of the pathology paradigm. My Mom
sought her parents’ support during an incredible transformation in her life, and they showed up
for her in her lived experience. Phenomenologically, they were present. When I worked to stay
close to both her and my own lived experience rather than wed to how I thought the world
worked, I was surprised to encounter our ancestors as well, an experience I feel uncertain that I
would have ever had without my Mom showing me the way. This was a transformational
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moment in my own life. Finding my ancestors connected me for the first time with a felt sense of
an ancestral lineage, with a personal history larger than my own, with a sense of family history
extending much farther back in time than the two generations that preceded me who I actually
got to meet. My web of connection, my felt sense of belonging in the world, expanded
considerably as a result. My Mom showed me that you can call upon your ancestors for support
and guidance.
Did you know that you can time travel?
Learning how to be with somebody with Alzheimer’s requires learning how to become
comfortable with time travel. Although it felt ontologically disorienting to time travel with
someone who has Alzheimer’s, it ultimately taught me that time travel opens up past experiences
as places of refuge, which became a great comfort in my journey with grief after my Mom died.
Time travelling opens up familiar places from the past within which one can feel a felt sense of
being at home. Time travel also allows for a longer engagement with what has passed, which is
an important prerequisite to processes of accountability, justice, and healing. This is something
that psychotherapists will understand as our field has begun to prize the question of “what
happened to you?” over the question “what is wrong with you?”. Healing involves looking back
in time. Time travel is a skill built upon resisting the collective flow of time; departing from the
cultural norms of how we structure and organize time. Time travel can become a form of
resistance to the forgetfulness of our era of capitalism, colonialism, consumerism and media
cycle, which collectively forgets by moving too quickly and linearly into the future to dwell in
the spiral of history. Slow down. Go back in time. Revisit what has passed. Enter into the past
with your being.
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Agency in death is difficult to discern.
The Western medical industrial complex has made possible a particular kind of agency in
dying through physician assisted death, at least in limited parts of the world. Although great
consideration and ongoing debate surrounds the legality of this type of death, our individualistic
society, a result of the main drivers of the Anthropocene – namely capitalism and colonialism –
has insufficiently addressed interdependence as it relates to agency in dying. Our most forgetful
elders remind us of our interdependence and complicate considerations of consent and agency,
especially regarding death. They also highlight that decisions to prolong life are as meaningful
and complex as decisions to hasten death. Our most forgetful elders remind us about the fluidity
and permeability of subjectivity, and as such they offer no quick solutions to understanding and
advocating for agency in death.
Be a steward of chronic grief.
Loving somebody with Alzheimer’s disease is a lesson in holding and honoring chronic
grief. Chronic grief is a characteristic response to ongoing losses, ambiguous losses, and slowmoving decline. Chronic grief is incredibly painful and can create a feeling of being-betweenworlds, or being liminal. Tending to chronic grief intentionally is necessary to survival; chronic
grief will make itself known in a million little ways, coming out sideways if it is ignored. How
can you be a good steward of chronic grief? What I have learned is that the basic ingredients are:
making containers of time and space for it in your daily and weekly life, seeking connection so
you have people whose arms you can fall apart into, and engaging in ritual. None of these things
will make chronic grief go away, but they will all support your survival of it.
Becoming oriented in chronic grief is an important skill for being and dying in the
Anthropocene. Although climate catastrophe continues to move incredibly fast on a geologic
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time scale, measured in human life what we are facing is a type of decline that will last through
our lifetimes, through multiple generations. Good tending of our grief is an important antidote to
denial, and it is important for transmitting the knowledge we have now to new generations. Even
stories from my parents’ generation illuminate the slow-moving losses we have faced; simple
stories about how many fewer bugs there are on the windshield after long drives now than when
my parents were children. These are the stories that let us know about the change that is taking
place around us, difficult sometimes to perceive from the shortness of our own lives. Grief will
come not only about the loss of life we navigate in the sixth mass extinction event now taking
place (Ceballos et al., 2015), but also how we got here through colonial violence enacted on
humans and non-humans (Mitchell, 2020). As a settler myself, socialized in a culture which
values objectification, commodification, exchange value, linear time, and has used genocide,
slavery, and environmental destruction and exploitation as its building blocks, I grieve my very
culture. I grieve the way I was taught to be in the world. I lament that this is all normal to me.
Grieving a chronic, ongoing loss takes fortitude, intention, support and time. Our most forgetful
elders, each held in social webs of chronic grief, teach us that it is possible to continue engaging
with the most heart-breaking parts of our lives. They train us in being adept at the liminality of
chronic grief. And this training, this preparation for transition, this willingness to undergo the
pain of transformation, is necessary as we face the existential threat of climate chaos brought
about by the drivers of the Anthropocene. If we are to respond to this threat with any success, we
must be willing to have our lives transform, we must engage in losses, we must endure grief, for
generations. Grief will either see us through the social transformations we need to survive this
threat, or it will serve us through our own ending. Grief is a practice, one our forgetful elders are
expert at teaching us, and practicing grief is the greatest skill to develop as we live during
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climate catastrophe.
Care is political.
People with Alzheimer’s need progressively more help from others as the disease
progresses. The amount of care needed can be staggering, especially for the smaller social
networks that are typical in American society during late-stage capitalism. The shrinking of
social networks can be attributed to trends of people moving to different regions for work in a
globalized economy, as well as to continuing processes of urbanization and gentrification of
working-class neighborhoods, which fragment local support networks. Smaller care networks
mean fewer people share the task of caregiving for people with Alzheimer’s disease, which can
significantly impact caregiver physical and mental health as well as the quality of life for those
living with Alzheimer’s. This dissertation has focused on themes about the gifts that our most
forgetful elders give us individually and collectively. This final subsection of the implications
section focuses on how we care for them, and how our most forgetful elders’ gifts must be
reciprocated within a framework of collective care.
Eldercare in general is an oft ignored but urgent area of attention for social justice
activists and scholars. The state of our systems of care for our elders is inadequate, to put it
gently. We are now seeing a swelling of the old age population as the baby boomers enter their
70s, but there has been no matching growth of the services catering to the old. The care services
that do exist have been globalized, such that a large amount of care-work has shifted to the
shoulders of immigrant women, who Silvia Federici (2012) reminds us are often undocumented
and are vulnerable to a great deal of abuse: long hours of work, no paid sick leave or other
benefits, exposure to racist behavior and sexual assault without adequate legal protections (p.
117). Meanwhile, for families who cannot afford to hire caregivers, publicly funded nursing
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homes are what some call the concentration camps of our day: in 2008, for example, the U.S.
government reported that 94% of our nursing homes have documented histories of abuse,
neglect, and violations of safety and health standards (Federici, 2012, p. 117). Political
economists and governments portray provisions that workers have won for their sustenance in
old age such as pensions and social security as an “economic time bomb” – unsustainable and
inadequate (Federici, 2012, p. 116).
Looking at the dire situation of eldercare in the U.S., and in particular for people with
Alzheimer’s disease who often need high levels of care, we are implored to reinvent our systems
of care. This is a question of our collective values. It is my hope that this dissertation casts light
upon the value that people with Alzheimer’s give to our communities and acts as motivation for
my readers to engage seriously with the issue of how we care for them. It will not be an easy
problem to solve and will involve demanding a governmental redistribution of wealth and
investments to provide adequate care for our most forgetful elders.
Areas for Further Study
This dissertation offers broad findings in regard to being in relation to people with
Alzheimer’s disease and contributes to humanistic and phenomenological accounts of the lived
experience of the disease. In addition to having implications for how we care for people with
Alzheimer’s disease and understand their ongoing contributions to society, this dissertation led to
a number of areas for further study. This dissertation has used autoethnographic means to arrive
at important themes, so the themes are based upon my own lived experience of being in relation
to my Mom. This dissertation is therefore very specifically culturally situated not only in the
United States but more specifically in the unique and largely privileged intersections of identity
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in which my Mom and I are located with regards to race, class, gender, ability, and other facets
of social identity. This dissertation suggests that further study would be fruitful to capture how
loving somebody with Alzheimer’s might be mediated by these intersections of identity and
cultural locations by examining the lived experience of people who occupy different positions
with regards to social privilege and oppression. For example, one of the questions I asked in this
dissertation was whether people with Alzheimer’s disease who have lived in a single
geographical area for their whole lives would have similar experiences of locating themselves in
different places, or whether this phenomenon reflected my Mom’s class privilege of having the
financial resources to move to different parts of the country during her lifetime. Another fruitful
area of further study would be to ask the question of what our most forgetful elders can teach us
about being, forgetting and dying in the Anthropocene – by interviewing people with
Alzheimer’s disease what their perspective on it is. There would likely be different answers than
revealed in this project, and the question itself, which is aimed at challenging the stigma
associated with Alzheimer’s disease, may be therapeutic to the participants who may not have
previously considered their ongoing contributions to society.
Practical Applications
This dissertation suggests a number of practical applications regarding loving and caring
for somebody with Alzheimer’s disease. There is a general consensus that person-centered care
for people with Alzheimer’s is recommended, meaning that caregivers are encouraged to go with
the flow of the person with Alzheimer’s description of their lifeworld. If they talk about being in
another time or place, it is recommended that caregivers improvise and join with the person’s
lived experience. However, practically this is sometimes done in a detached or condescending
116

way, without genuine curiosity and attention to what the caregiver might learn from the
experience. This dissertation suggests that there are important benefits to caregivers from the act
of joining with their loved ones that can increase the caregiver’s comfort with time travel, a
supportive factor in the experience of grief.
Other practical applications include the ways that intersubjectivity and permeability of
people to their place, relationships, and orientation to things, may influence how we structure
sites and relationships of caregiving. While there has been interest and attention in some assisted
living facilities to the architectural and interior design of such structures to facilitate feelings of
comfort and familiarity, these design considerations are often in tension with economic
feasibility and are typically reserved for those who have considerable wealth. This dissertation
emphasizes the importance of place for supporting a sense of safety and belonging for our most
forgetful elders, and demonstrates that this is an essential need rather than something that should
be reserved for those with the most economic means.
This dissertation may also be practically useful for other people who love somebody with
Alzheimer’s disease to gain insight into their own and their loved one’s experiences. One of the
very challenging parts of being in the position of loving somebody with Alzheimer’s disease is
feeling alone and misunderstood by peers who have not had similar experiences. That was
certainly a part of my own experience, which was perhaps amplified because of my young age
when I went through this, mostly during my 20s. Even at Alzheimer’s support groups specific to
adult children of parents with early onset Alzheimer’s disease, I found myself to be younger by
over a decade than anybody else who attended. My sense of isolation made my grief more
difficult to carry. Reading literature such as this dissertation, which values personal narrative as
the primary source of data, may reduce other’s experience of feeling alone and may offer insights
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that help people find the gifts in their forgetful elder’s new ways of being in the world.
Finally, it is my hope that this dissertation offers practical guidance for our society to
listen to the unique wisdom that our most forgetful elders can share about being, forgetting and
dying in the Anthropocene. As we navigate collective issues of denial, transformation, existential
threat, and grief, our forgetful elders can help us orient to a disorienting world.
Limitations
Any research based on a single person’s lived experience, including case studies and
autoethnographies, has inherent limitations. While these types of studies offer a depth of
qualitative data that provide valuable insight, it is inherently difficult to make general claims
from them. This dissertation has attempted to connect my personal narrative with philosophical
and theoretical chapters that extend the narrative into more generalizable ideas, however they are
still limited in scope and undoubtedly hold bias from my own cultural situatedness as a white
able-bodied queer woman with class privilege. Writing autoethnographically into the
forgetfulness of the Anthropocene was inherently challenging as I attempted to write into my
own inherited forgetfulness from this era, and write toward another way of being in the world
that I do not yet fully know how to be. Furthermore, the Anthropocene is such a broad concept
that it was difficult at times to differentiate whether some aspects of what I wrote about were
characteristic of the Anthropocene, or perhaps of some smaller or more limited and specific
cultural phenomenon.
Further limitations are specific to the lack of representation of my Mom’s voice in this
dissertation. While the dissertation was specifically focused on my own experiences, I would
have liked to discuss with her some of the ideas, themes, and gifts that I described receiving from
118

her to see how she perceived these things. Because this project began when she was already in
the late stage of the disease and the majority of this dissertation was written following her death,
I did not have the opportunity to do this. This is a significant limitation in verifying the accuracy
of my perception of her experience, which I tried to mitigate by emphasizing that the data I
collected was based upon my experience. It is also a limitation in my personal experience of this
project: I wish I could have shared this with her for the sake of our connection and relationship.
Although I don’t know whether she would agree with everything that I wrote (in fact, knowing
my Mom, I am fairly confident she would have opinions about a lot of the things I wrote!), I do
know that she would be proud of my work and my ongoing dedication to our relationship. When
she had Alzheimer’s, she thought of me as younger than I was, and typically thought I was in
college rather than in a PhD program. I know she would be profoundly proud of my decision to
pursue a PhD in clinical psychology, and of course, the completion of this dissertation indicates
my completion of my doctoral degree, which she would have been thrilled to celebrate.
Closing
This dissertation explored my lived experience of being in relation to my Mom and
connected this experience with broader sociocultural, psychological, and philosophical
phenomena and ideas. Above all, this project kept me deeply engaged in relationship with my
Mom in all parts of my being – heart, head, body, spirit. She has offered me many gifts through
her time with Alzheimer’s disease, many of which will serve me as I continue to navigate being,
forgetting and dying in the Anthropocene. Undoubtedly these gifts have and will continue to be
expressed through me in my clinical work with patients, and I hope that this dissertation
additionally extends her gifts to a wider audience. I also hope that it invites my readers to
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become newly curious about relating to the forgetful elders in their lives, and to themselves
should they become a forgetful elder in the future themselves, as we navigate the Anthropocene
together.
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